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This paper studies net foreign assets and the differential returns between gross foreign assets 
and liabilities for a sample of 49 countries between 1981 and 2007. It shows that investment 
income is more important than capital gains in imparting a drift to net foreign assets over the 
long-run, whereas the latter dominate short-term dynamics. Excess returns on net foreign 
assets of the United States are indeed exorbitant from a global perspective, only occasionally 
matched by other countries and mainly accounted for by positive valuation effects. The role 
of the United States as levered investor did not contribute to its exorbitant privilege. The 
econometric panel analysis also fails to find a robust positive relationship between leverage 
and excess returns. Notably, instead, real exchange rate depreciations increase excess returns 
through capital gains, proportionally to the relative foreign currency exposure. Excess yields 
on investment income are positively associated with the country risk rating. 
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Non-technical summary  
There is a growing interest in the academia and policy circles on the returns that a 
country can obtain from its foreign assets and must pay on its foreign liabilities. This 
interest has been prompted by two separate developments. The first one is the process 
of international financial integration and capital account liberalisation which was 
accompanied by the growth in the size of gross foreign assets and liabilities. In turn, 
large gross foreign positions magnify the impact of small differences in returns on the 
net external position. The second development is the accumulation and sustainability 
of large external deficits by the United States. Economists noted that U.S. residents 
pay relatively low returns on their liabilities to foreigners, while earning relatively 
high returns on their foreign assets. This positive “excess return” on net foreign 
assets, known in the literature as the “exorbitant privilege” of issuing an international 
currency, facilitates the sustainability of large negative external positions. This is 
usually viewed as a consequence of the central position of the United States in the 
international monetary system and, in particular, its role as the main financial centre 
of the world, issuing safe low-yield liabilities to finance risky investment abroad, 
transforming savings from the rest of the world in risky capital. 
While studies on the excess return on net foreign assets of the United States are now 
numerous, this exorbitant privilege has been rarely compared to that of other 
countries. This paper fills this gap, extending and deepening the analysis of the excess 
returns on net foreign assets to a number of major advanced and emerging economies, 
covering up to 49 countries over the period between 1981 and 2007. In particular, the 
paper systematically documents the contribution of investment income and capital 
gains to the evolution of net foreign positions from two different perspectives: the 
cumulated impact over time and the differential returns between assets and liabilities. 
In addition, it studies the role of potential determinants of excess total returns and its 
components, yields and rates of capital gain. In particular, the effect of exchange rate 
changes on excess returns is carefully investigated, using the new estimates of foreign 
currency exposure of Lane and Shambaugh (2007) and creating a finance-weighted 
exchange rate index to properly gauge valuation effects. 
There are a number of potentially interesting findings emerging from this analysis. 
First, the paper shows that the investment income is more important than capital gains 
in imparting a drift to net foreign assets over the long term, whereas capital gains 
transmit their short-term volatility to total returns.  
Second, this study confirms that the excess return on net foreign assets of the United 
States, more than 330 basis points per year between 1981 and 2007, is indeed 
exorbitant from a global perspective, larger than in other countries, consistently 
through time, and statistically significant. One third of this excess return is accounted 
for by a positive yield differential from investment income and two thirds by capital 
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gains. At least as regards yields from the investment income, other major issuers of 
international currencies, such as Japan and Switzerland, enjoy positive differential 
returns almost similar to those of the United States. The euro area instead does not 
enjoy a yield privilege similar to other issuers of international currencies. On a 
positive note, though, a negative yield differential on the net foreign assets of euro 
area member states has been virtually eliminated in the run-up to EMU accession. 
The excess returns stemming from the capital gains of the United States are instead 
not matched by any other major issuer of international currencies and only by a 
handful of countries. 
Third, the decomposition of excess returns shows that the exorbitant privilege of the 
United States is the result of an extraordinary return effect, i.e. the better performance 
of U.S. investment abroad compared to foreign investment in each of the main 
categories of the international investment position. Contrary to the finding of 
previous studies, the composition effect – i.e. the impact of a higher share of riskier 
investment in the foreign assets relative to liabilities – is negative. In different terms, 
the position of the United States as “levered investor” did not contribute to its 
exorbitant privilege, at least over the past two decades.  
Finally, the econometric analysis of excess returns also fails to find a robust positive 
relationship between leverage and excess returns in our panel of countries. There 
seem to be other more important determinants of excess returns. Notably, countries 
experiencing large real exchange rate depreciations may hope to boost their excess 
returns on net foreign assets, with an impact that is proportional to the relative foreign 
currency exposure. This effect is channelled through capital gains, not through 
investment income. Excess yields on investment income are instead positively 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the academia and policy circles on the returns that a 
country can obtain from its foreign assets and must pay on its foreign liabilities. 
This interest has been prompted by two separate developments. The first one is 
the process of international financial integration and capital account liberalisation 
which was accompanied by the growth in the size of gross foreign assets and 
liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). In turn, large gross foreign asset and 
liability positions tend to magnify the impact of small differences in returns on the 
net external position (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005a and 2005b). The second 
development was the accumulation of large external deficits by the United States 
and the presence of two puzzles in the dynamic of U.S. external accounts. Large 
current account deficits have been only partly reflected in a deterioration of the 
international investment position of the United States, a first puzzle. In addition, 
the income balance of the United States – the net flow of revenues generated by 
foreign investment positions – has persistently remained positive in spite of an 
overall negative external stock position. This is because U.S. residents pay 
relatively low returns on their liabilities to foreigners, while earning relatively 
high returns on their foreign assets. Economists usually view this second puzzle as 
the outcome of the central role of the United States in the international monetary 
system as issuer of the main international currency, where the United States issues 
relatively safe, low yield dollar liabilities to foreigners, mainly in the form of debt 
securities, and invest the proceeds in riskier high-yield investment abroad. These 
two puzzles contribute to the so-called “exorbitant privilege” of issuing an 
international currency and being the main financial centre of the world, fulfilling 
the task of and being compensated for transforming savings from the rest of the 
world in risky capital.
1   
While studies on the excess return on net foreign assets of the United States 
are now numerous, this exorbitant privilege has been rarely compared to that of 
other countries. This paper fills this gap, extending and deepening the analysis of 
the excess returns on net foreign assets to a number of major advanced and 
emerging economies, covering up to 49 countries over the period between 1981 
and 2007. The main contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, the 
paper systematically documents the contribution of investment income and capital 
gains to the evolution of net foreign positions from two different perspectives: the 
                                                 
1 These two puzzles are conceptually separate but often confused in the literature. The confusion 
arises form the fact that both valuation gains and investment income, concur to a positive return 
differential in the case of the United States. Nevertheless, only valuation gains, not investment 
income, explain the divergence from cumulated current account deficits and the net international 
investment position, the first puzzle. 
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cumulated impact over time and the differential returns between assets and 
liabilities. Second, it studies the role of potential determinants of excess total 
returns and its components, yields and rates of capital gain. In particular, the 
effect of exchange rate changes on excess returns is carefully investigated, using 
the new estimates of foreign currency exposure of Lane and Shambaugh (2007) 
and creating a finance-weighted exchange rate index to properly gauge valuation 
effects. In addition, the empirical analysis controls for the impact of other 
explanatory variables, such as leverage, testing the hypothesis of Gourinchas and 
Rey (2005) across several countries, and country risk.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, I review the literature on the 
exorbitant privilege and the returns on foreign assets and liabilities (section 2). In 
the next section, I introduce the data and outline the methodology (section 3). 
Subsequently, I clarify and quantify the contribution of investment income vis-à-
vis capital gains to the dynamic of net foreign assets over the long-run (section 4). 
Next, a thorough analysis of excess returns across the countries in our sample is 
presented (section 5). For a selected number of countries – including in particular 
the euro area as a whole – it was possible to obtain disaggregated data by asset 
class. These data are used to show the contribution of each asset class (FDI, 
equity, debt and other) to excess returns, which are furthermore decomposed in a 
return effect – resulting from excess returns within each asset class – and a 
composition effect – stemming from the relative importance of each asset class in 
assets and liabilities (section 6).   Finally, the possible determinants of excess total 
returns, yields and rates of capital gain on net foreign assets – such as real 
exchange rates, leverage and country risk – are tested in an econometric panel 
analysis (section 7). Section 8 concludes the paper.  
2.  Literature review  
Much of the recent literature on returns on net foreign assets focussed on 
explanation, questioning and dissection of the special case of the United States, 
starting from the provocative contribution of Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). 
The latter maintain that the (positive) income balance of the United States 
measures the “true value” of its foreign assets, which are therefore positive and 
not negative as reported by financial statistics. The difference between the fair 
valuation of U.S. net foreign assets and official statistics is what these two authors 
call “dark matter”. This is in turn accounted by (a) mismeasurement of FDI – with 
the latter failing to capture export of U.S. intangible capital – and (b) unreported 
trade of liquidity and insurance services provided by the United States – reflecting 
seigniorage and a negative risk premium on U.S. dollar reserve assets.  These two 
potential explanations are at the core of the debate on the exorbitant privilege.  
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1158
February 2010 
Indeed, one of the main reasons why the income balance of the United States 
has remained in positive territory is due to excess returns from U.S. direct 
investment abroad relative to returns from FDI made in the United States (Higgins 
et al., 2005 and ECB, 2006). This in turn has been justified on the grounds of (i) a 
seniority or maturity premium of U.S. direct investment abroad compared to 
foreign investment in the United States (Mataloni, 2000); (ii) compensation for 
the relatively higher risk attached to U.S. investment abroad (Hung and Mascaro, 
2004); (iii) tax-induced income shifting of multinational companies (Bosworth et 
al., 2007); (iv) asymmetries in recorded reinvested earnings (Gros, 2006b).  
The role of the United States as provider of international liquidity and safe 
financial assets is the second main classical rationale for the existence of the 
exorbitant privilege. The first function – liquidity provision to the rest of the 
world – is the traditional view dating back to the contribution of Triffin (1960). 
The second one – the provision of safe financial assets – is the modern version of 
the Triffin dilemma (Caballero et al., 2008 and Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
2009). Gourinchas and Rey (2005) tried to quantify this latter role of the United 
States as levered investor, shorting safe low-yield assets to invest in risky high-
yield securities. They find that this “composition effect”, or “leverage”, stemming 
from the asymmetric structure of U.S. foreign assets and liabilities, increased over 
time, explaining up to a quarter of the exorbitant privilege, which they estimate at 
more than 3 percent per year in the post Bretton Woods period.
2 In their view, 
leverage - measured by the share of risky assets, FDI and equity, in total assets 
relative to the same share in total liabilities - could be a potential determinant of 
excess returns.  
The existence of an exorbitant privilege, at least as regards portfolio 
securities, has been challenged by Curcuru et al. (2008). These authors show that 
there is a bias in the calculation of returns owing to the internal inconsistency of 
stock data – which are subject to substantial revisions – and flow data – only 
partly revised. Using original series or, alternatively, returns from portfolios with 
a similar structure of U.S. foreign assets and liabilities, the return differential 
disappears. Indeed, Gros (2006a) already pointed to the large size – more than 1 
trillion U.S. dollars between 1989 and 2004 – of the category “other changes” in 
the valuation adjustment of the net international investment position by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, as the main driver of the divergence between the 
cumulated U.S. current account deficit and the net international investment 
position. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) make a thorough examination of this 
statistical discrepancy, concluding that it could reflect unrecorded financial flows 
                                                 
2 It should be borne in mind that this figure refers to total real returns, including both yields from 
the income balance and capital gains from exchange rate and asset price movements. 
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in the portfolio category and mismeasured initial positions of non-portfolio 
holdings of banks and non-banks. In short, there is convincing evidence that 
statistical adjustments, not the over-performance of U.S. investments or exchange 
rate effects, would explain large net positive valuation gains by the U.S. and part 
of the excess return implied in the U.S. net foreign assets. 
With the exception of the seminal work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 
2003, 2005a and 2005b) returns on net foreign assets of countries different from 
the United States have received much less attention. In particular, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2005a and 2005b) show the importance of valuation effects over 
the past decade in creating a wedge between net asset positions and cumulated 
current account balances and find that total real rates of returns are sensitive to 
exchange rate movements, an important source of valuation gains in conjunction 
with changes in asset prices. Bracke and Schmitz (2008) compute implied returns 
on international portfolio equity holdings, a subset of the international investment 
position, for a sample of industrial and emerging market economies, finding that  
net capital gain channel appears to be more important than the net investment 
income channel for risk sharing. Finally, only Meissner and Taylor (2006) devote 
attention to the “excess returns” in other major G7 economies. Notably, they find 
that also the United Kingdom, France and Japan enjoy a positive return 
differential, which is however statistically significant only for the latter two 
countries and only for yield differentials (i.e. from investment income). On the 
contrary, Canada and Italy have negative yield and total return differentials.  
3.  Data and methodology 
Data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics on the balance of payments and 
the international investment positions have been collected for 49 countries 
between 1980 and 2007 on an annual basis. For many countries, in particular 
emerging markets, stock data are available only for the most recent period. For 
these countries, the international investment positions have been completed 
backward to 1980 using the Mark-II dataset on the external wealth of nations of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The final dataset includes 20 advanced 
economies, defined as those countries in the sample which have at least three 
decades of OECD membership, and 29 major emerging market economies mainly 
from eastern Asia, Latin America and central and eastern Europe.
3 A detailed 
description of the country coverage is available in Appendix A.1. 
                                                 
3 The group of advanced economies include all founding members of the OECD with the 
exception of Belgium, Iceland and Luxembourg.  Turkey is also an OECD founding member, but 
included among the emerging market economies. 
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Returns on foreign assets and liabilities are calculated as in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2004, 2005a and 2005b) in nominal and real domestic currency terms. In 
practice, flow data from the balance of payments in a given year are divided by 
international investment positions at the end of the previous year to generate 
returns on foreign positions. The methodology is described below.  
As a first step, it is possible to use a simple balance of payments accounting 
framework to decompose the change in net foreign assets in its main 
determinants:  
) ( 1 t t t t t t EO KA KG CA B B + + + ≡ − −   (1)
The change in the net foreign asset position, Bt - Bt-1, between time t and t-1 is 
equal to the current account balance at time t, CAt, plus capital account transfers, 
KAt, (usually a very small item of the BoP), errors and omission, EOt, and finally 
the capital gain or loss at time t, KGt, resulting from changes in asset prices and 
the exchange rate at which assets and liabilities positions are valued at the end of 
the year. The latter is simply calculated as the difference between net financial 
flows at time t (i.e. the current account plus other residual items) and the change 
in net positions.  It is useful to further refine the current account in its main 
components: the balance of trade in goods and services, BGSt, unilateral transfers 
(including compensation of employees),
 UTt,
 4 and the investment income balance, 
IIBt, all at time t:
  
1 () tt t t t t t t BB B G SU TI I BK G K AE O − −≡ ++++ +   (2)
Another way to look at equation (2) is to solve it backward for past values of Bt. 
 
00 0 0 0
()
tt t t t
ti i i i i i
ii i i i
BB G SU TI I BK GK A E O
== = = =
≡+ + + + + ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (3)
The net international investment position in each period is equal to the cumulated 
sum of the current account balance – or its subcomponents – cumulated capital 
gains and cumulated errors and omissions. 
Finally, dividing all terms in equation (2) by nominal GDP and rearranging 




t t t t t t z b kg iib ut bgs b b +
+
− + + + ≡ − − − 1 1 1 γ
γ
  (4)
                                                 
4 In the standard balance of payments presentation, the income balance includes income from 
labour (compensation of employees), and investment income from direct and financial investment. 
Here, the labour income is separated in order to highlight the role of investment income and yields 
on foreign investment positions.  
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where letters in lower case in italic indicate now ratios to nominal GDP; zt is the 
residual term of errors and omission plus the capital account, and γt is the growth 
rate of nominal GDP. The term -γt/(1+γt)bt-1 measures the contribution of positive 
nominal GDP growth in stabilising the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. 
From equation (4), the next step is to derive implied rates of return. 
Following a notation only in part similar to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a and 
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where  A and L denote gross foreign assets and liabilities, respectively. The 
superscripts A and L indicate that we use only one side of external statistics to 
calculate returns. Therefore, II
A are earnings from assets held abroad by domestic 
residents, whereas II
L  are payments to foreigners holding domestic assets. 
Similarly, capital gains are calculated using only changes in gross assets (∆A) and 
capital outflows (F
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and,  tt t rik =+ is the nominal total return at time t. The bar above the variables 
indicates that these are all nominal returns in domestic currency terms. Using the 
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  (real total return)  (6c) 
where the superscript J = A, L indicates whether returns are on assets or liabilities; 
πt is the domestic inflation rate at time t; , , tt t ikr  are the real yield, real rate of 
capital gain and real total return, respectively. It is important to note that, by 
construction, the real total return is not equal to the sum of the real yield and the 
real rate of capital gain, but it is necessary to add the term [π/(1+π)], which in any 
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case disappears when calculating excess real total returns as difference between 
returns on assets and liabilities. Therefore: 
                          ( )     ( )  
1
AL
AL A L AL tt








  excess real total return  =  excess real yield + excess real rate of capital gain 
This is the key identity that will be analysed throughout the rest of the paper.  
Taking equation (4) of the dynamic of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP 
in the previous section, adding the balance on goods and services together with 
transfers under the term, bgstt, noting that: 
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where at-1 and lt-1 denote assets and liabilities, respectively, as a share of GDP at 
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where gt denotes the real GDP growth rate. Equations (9a) and (9b) highlights that 
the size of excess returns and their interaction with “gross” asset or liability 
positions are both important in driving changes in net foreign assets as share of 
GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005a and 2005b).
5 Countries with positive 
excess returns, such as the United States, will find it easier to stabilise the net 
foreign assets as a share of GDP over the long-run, i.e. they will be allowed to run 
larger trade deficits or smaller trade surpluses. 
Balance of payments data from the IMF and the Mark-II databases are 
reported in U.S. dollar.  For the calculations of real domestic currency returns, 
U.S. dollar series are converted at end-year exchange rates (stock positions) or 
average annual exchange rates (flow data) from the IMF International Financial 
                                                 
5 In the current presentation, equations (9a) and (9b) are solved to show the interaction of excess 
returns with the gross “asset” position in the previous period, at-1; however, it is straightforward to 
rewrite them in terms of interaction of excess returns with gross liabilities. 
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Statistics (IFS). Nominal rates are deflated with the Consumer Price Index 
inflation to calculate real returns.  
4.  Net foreign assets, investment income and valuation effects   
The recent literature on the dynamics of net foreign assets emphasises the impact 
of valuation effects for the sustainability of external positions. These valuation 
effects are generated by swings in the market value of domestic and foreign 
investment (asset price channel) and changes in the exchange rate at which the 
foreign currency component of foreign assets and liabilities are valued (exchange 
rate channel).  As regards the asset-price channel, the over performance of the 
domestic equity or bond market vis-à-vis the foreign markets in which residents 
have allocated their foreign portfolio produces a deterioration of the net foreign 
position. The impact of the exchange rate channel depends instead on the “net” 
foreign currency external position. For countries that have a long external position 
in foreign currency – i.e. more foreign currency assets than foreign currency 
liabilities – a depreciation of the exchange rate produces a positive valuation 
effect. This is usually the case for more advanced economies. On the contrary, 
developing and emerging markets are often short in foreign currency and 
experience a deterioration in the net foreign position following a depreciation that 
raises the domestic currency value of liabilities (Lane and Shambaugh, 2007).  
These valuation effects are relatively large in the case of the United States, 
but also for some emerging markets which experienced large depreciation or 
appreciation of their exchange rate (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005a and 2005b). 
However, it is important to note that both the relative performance of asset prices 
and the level of exchange rates tend to fluctuate, so that gains in one period are 
often followed by losses in the next period. It is therefore difficult to understand 
how “permanent” these wealth effects are and gauge their relative importance 
compared to the different items of the current account. 
In order to understand the relative importance of these factors, in this section, 
we look at the cumulative impact of the different components of the current 
account vis-à-vis capital gains. First, we show the evidence of selected economies 
with the aim of highlighting possible patterns in the evolution of net foreign 
assets. Subsequently, a complete and systematic assessment of the whole sample 
of countries is presented. Charts 1a to 1f  illustrate the evolution of the net 
international investment position compared to the cumulated current account 
(excluding investment income) for selected countries between 1980 and 2007. 
The charts show also the cumulated capital gains and investment income, 
separately, in order to highlight their contribution to the change in net foreign 
14
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assets.  Cumulated capital gains and investment income are assumed to be zero in 
1980, whereas the cumulated current account (excluding income) starts at the 
same level of the international investment position.
6  
Chart 1. Decomposition of net foreign assets. 1980-2007 (USD billion) 
















































































Notes. The charts display the net foreign asset position (NFA) of each country and its decomposition according to a slightly 
modified version of equation (3) in the main text: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) NFA BGST IIB KG EO KA ≡+ + + + ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
where  Σ(BGST) is the cumulated balance on goods and services including unilateral transfers and compensation of 
employees; Σ(IIB) is the cumulated investment income balance; Σ(KG) are cumulated capital gains. The term Σ(EO + KA), 
cumulated errors and omissions plus the capital account, is not shown. 
                                                 
6 Charts are based on equation (2), adding the balance of goods and services together with 
unilateral transfers. To make the charts easier to interpret, errors and omissions and the capital 
account are not shown. 
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The six countries have been chosen to highlight different patterns in the 
evolution of net foreign assets and their components. Charts 1a and 1b show the 
paradigm of the Anglo-Saxon economies which have been able to run almost 
without interruption substantial trade deficits for several decades, resulting in 
large negative foreign asset positions. Among the different explanations of these 
external deficits and, in particular, the absence of tensions for their sustainability, 
two of the most popular justifications include positive productivity shocks within 
the framework of the present value theory of the current account (Glick and 
Rogoff, 1995) and, more recently, the greater ability of the Anglo-Saxon countries 
to generate financial assets in order to absorb capital inflows and a global savings 
glut (Bernanke, 2005, and Caballero et al. 2008). It is useful to contrast the United 
States and Australia to highlight similarities and differences. In the case of the 
United States, the still positive income balance and large valuation gains, 
equivalent to a cumulated amount of USD 3.7 trillion between 1980 and 2007, 
moderated the worsening of the net foreign position compared to cumulated trade 
deficits. It is interesting to note that the bulk of valuation gains accrued since 2000 
and, as noted in section 2, they are not fully explained by asset price and exchange 
rate movements, but also by statistical adjustments. In the case of Australia, trade 
balance dynamics are roughly similar to those of the United States; however, in 
the absence of any exorbitant privilege or other “puzzles”, the net debtor position 
generates debt servicing obligations that worsen its sustainability. The cumulated 
negative investment income balance of Australia between 1980 and 2007 (USD -
334 billion) explains more than half of the worsening of its net foreign asset 
position (USD 550 billion) over the same period.  
Charts 1c and 1d show instead the two largest surplus countries, Germany 
and Japan, among the advanced economies. In both cases, a series of large trade 
surpluses imparts a clear positive trend to the net foreign assets, whereas 
cumulated capital gains are relatively small. In the case of Japan the accumulation 
of positive investment income plays a grater role compared to Germany.  
The comparison between two Latin American emerging economies, 
Argentina and Brazil, is instructive of the possible different impact of emerging 
market crises on valuation gains and net foreign assets over the long-run (Charts 
1e and 1f). Both countries underwent several currency and financial crises in the 
period under observation. In the case of Argentina, the 1991 and 2001 crises 
brought about large valuation gains as the exchange rate dropped and domestic 
asset prices (i.e. the market value of the claims of foreigners on domestic 
residents) collapsed. More importantly, these valuation shocks are not reversed 
and, therefore, seem to have a permanent impact on net foreign assets. On the 
contrary, in Brazil, the weakness of the Brazilian currency and financial markets 
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following the 1999 currency crisis, generated large valuation gains for only a few 
years. Starting from 2004, these gains were quickly reversed and transformed in 
large losses, as the successful recovery and macroeconomic stabilisation boosted 
Brazilian asset prices and its currency. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
investment income balance appears to be a main driver of net foreign asset 
positions in these two Latin American countries. 
In general, cumulated capital gains appear to be more volatile than 
investment income – or the trade and service balance – and hover around or cross 
the zero line over time, indicating that their long-term impact could be close to 
zero. On the contrary, the cumulated investment income balance often imparts a 
strong drift to net foreign assets that can be reverted only when the balance of 
goods and services manages to turn around the net foreign asset position. Both 
components, valuation gains and investment income, may drive the net foreign 
asset position far apart from the cumulated balance of trade in goods and services. 
In a more formal and complete exposition, Table 1 summarises the 
decomposition of the change in net foreign assets between 1980 and 2007 
according to equation (4) in section 3. The contributions of each sub-component 
to the dynamics of net foreign assets are averaged across 40 countries in our 
sample, 20 advanced economies and 20 emerging markets.
7 This decomposition is 
based on the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, the relevant concept for external 
sustainability, and includes the effect of positive GDP growth in stabilising 
external positions.  
A number of interesting observations emerge from the analysis of these 
figures. First, across the whole sample, the absolute value of cumulated 
investment income  – a negative change by 57 percentage points as ratio to GDP 
between 1980 and 2007 – is much larger – ten times larger – than that of valuation 
effects – an increase by 5 percentage points over the same period. Not 
surprisingly, FDI, equity and debt servicing obligations are particularly large for 
emerging economies, accounting for a deterioration by 75 percentage points in the 
average ratio of net foreign assets to GDP between 1980 and 2007. On average, 
the negative investment income contributed also to the worsening by almost 40 
percentage points in the net foreign position for advanced economies.
8  Both, the 
                                                 
7 In order to compare cumulated gains over the same time period, seven transition countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) have been 
excluded from the sample. Other two Asian emerging economies (Singapore and Philippines) have 
been excluded since the link between two different datasets, IMF BPS and Mark-II, generates 
artificial abnormal valuation gains. 
8 As noted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), there is a discrepancy in the world balance on 
income, where payments to foreign investors tend on average to exceed earnings on foreign assets. 
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balance on goods and services and the GDP growth, on average, have rather large 
and positive contributions to the change in net foreign assets. 
Table 1. Change in net foreign assets. 1980 - 2007  (percentage of GDP) 
All countries 1980-2007 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2007
Net foreign assets 3.5 -10.8 9.4 -3.9 -0.7 9.5
Balance on goods and services 31.6 -1.8 4.8 1.0 7.1 20.4
Unilateral Transfers 13.0 3.5 3.9 3.1 1.4 1.0
Net investment income -57.0 -12.3 -12.3 -9.9 -9.3 -13.2
Capital gain/loss -5.2 2.6 2.4 -4.7 1.1 -6.6
Growth effect 25.4 -1.9 10.0 5.6 0.1 11.5
Other adjustments -4.3 -1.0 0.5 1.0 -1.1 -3.6
Advanced economies 1980-2007 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2007
Net foreign assets -5.5 -7.1 3.2 -2.6 -2.8 3.7
Balance on goods and services 32.8 -1.9 0.8 7.0 10.1 16.8
Unilateral Transfers 0.4 2.2 2.1 1.3 -1.0 -4.3
Net investment income -38.6 -7.5 -8.0 -8.6 -7.1 -7.4
Capital gain/loss -16.0 -1.4 -0.8 -5.1 -3.5 -5.2
Growth effect 22.7 0.2 8.5 2.0 0.2 11.9
Other adjustments -6.8 1.3 0.7 0.9 -1.5 -8.1
Emerging markets 1980-2007 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2007
Net foreign assets 12.6 -14.5 15.5 -5.3 1.5 15.4
Balance on goods and services 30.4 -1.7 8.9 -4.9 4.0 24.1
Unilateral Transfers 25.6 4.9 5.6 5.0 3.8 6.4
Net investment income -75.5 -17.0 -16.6 -11.2 -11.5 -19.1
Capital gain/loss 5.6 6.6 5.7 -4.4 5.8 -8.1
Growth effect 28.1 -3.9 11.6 9.2 0.0 11.2
Other adjustments -1.7 -3.3 0.3 1.1 -0.7 0.9
 
Notes. Table 1 shows the decomposition of the change in net foreign assets as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2007 




t t t t t t z b kg iib ut bgs b b +
+
− + + + ≡ − − − 1 1 1 γ
γ  
Reported figures are unweighted averages for 40 countries out of the 49 countries in the sample. In this table, seven 
transition (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and two Asian 
economies (Singapore and Philippines) have been excluded in order to keep the sample balanced over time. See Section 
3 and Appendix A.1 for list of countries and definition of groups. 
 
Second, the analysis of the temporal evolution of the various components of 
the net foreign assets shows that the contribution of investment income is rather 
stable, whereas, as expected, valuation effects alternate positive and negative 
signs. It is also worth noting that for emerging market economies, which are 
recipients of remittances and official assistance, unilateral transfers are an 
                                                                                                                                      
See also next section, where we show that the yield from the investment income balance on 
foreign liabilities is systematically larger than the yield on foreign assets.  
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important and stable external source of funding, contributing by 25 percentage 
points to the improvement in their net foreign assets between 1980 and 2007. 
Finally, focussing on the most recent period between 2000 and 2007, it is 
possible to identify a large contribution of trade surpluses to the average change in 
net foreign assets. Bearing in mind that these figures are unweighted averages, 
this may be reconciled with the presence of global imbalances, where many 
surplus countries are needed to make up for one single large deficit country – the 
United States. Cumulated capital gains are also slightly larger between 2000 and 
2007 compared to previous sub-periods, reflecting large swings in asset prices and 
rising gross foreign positions. 
Overall, the analysis in this section shows that the investment income balance 
– as well as naturally the balance on goods and services – is more important than 
valuation effects in imparting a drift to net foreign assets over the long-run. 
Valuation effects are indeed becoming large, but their long-run contribution to 
changes in net foreign assets is of second order importance compared to other 
categories. Occasionally, however, valuation gains or losses may produce a 
structural shift in the dynamic of net foreign assets, as a result of country-specific 
financial crises with permanent effects or prolonged asset price booms.   
5.  Excess returns on net foreign assets: an international 
comparison    
The previous section clarified the relative importance of investment income and 
capital gains for the evolution of net foreign assets over the long-run. As shown in 
section 3, these two items are the result of the interaction between rates of returns 
and gross asset or liability positions. Let us now take another perspective, 
focussing only on the returns, in particular differential returns between foreign 
assets and liabilities, in order to understand the size of the exorbitant privilege of 
the United States compared to other countries.  
The set of Charts 2a-2g illustrates the behaviour of excess returns in our 
sample and its decomposition in excess yields and excess rates of capital gain 
according to equation (7). Charts 2a, 2c, and 2e, on the left hand-side, show the 
average excess return for the whole sample and, separately, the group of advanced 
and emerging countries. Charts 2b, 2d, and 2f on the right hand-side show the 
excess return of the United States compared to the issuers of major international 
currencies: Japan and the euro area; where the excess return of the latter is simply 
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calculated as the unweighted average of national data of 10 euro area member 
states.
9  
Chart 2. Excess real returns, yields and rates of capital gain. 1981-2007 
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L) and rates of capital gain (k
A-k
L) are calculated according to equations 
(5) to (7) in the main text. Euro (10) includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. See data appendix A.1 for the list of countries and definition of groups. 
                                                 
9 In this section, we present the average excess returns of the euro area member states for which it 
was possible to collect data in order to run a comparison dating back to 1980s. The euro (10) 
group includes the founding members of the euro plus Greece, excluding Belgium and 
Luxembourg. The consolidated presentation of the euro area balance of payments and international 
investment position is available only from 1999. Returns from the consolidated euro area external 
accounts are analysed in the next section.  
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Comparing the excess yield with the excess rate of capital gain, it is evident 
that the latter is much more volatile. Moreover, as the size of spikes in excess 
capital gains is much larger than average excess yields, the volatility of capital 
gains is transmitted to total returns, whose plots (2a and 2b) are very similar to 
those of capital gains (2e and 2f). Indeed, the correlation between excess total 
returns and excess capital gains is almost equal to one (0.97), whereas the 
correlation between excess total returns and excess yields is much lower (0.24). 
Bearing in mind the conclusions of the previous section, it is worth noting that 
even though excess capital gains are large, they swing around the zero line with 
gains being followed by losses. In other words, over the long-run, relatively small 
but stable (excess) yields may have a stronger impact on net foreign assets than 
large and volatile rates of capital gain. Over the short-run, rates of capital gain 
drive the behaviour of total returns. 
Emerging market economies seem to have more volatile rates of capital gain 
than advanced economies (plot 2e), resulting in larger spikes in excess total 
returns (plot 2a). Emerging markets as a whole have an unfavourable yield 
differential between assets and liabilities, which is consistent with the existence of 
a risk premium on their foreign liabilities (plot 2c). This risk premium rose 
starting from 2000, with the negative differential widening to more than 3 percent 
in 2004; a rather surprising outcome considering the improvement in 
macroeconomic performance experienced by emerging markets over this period. 
On average, for all countries in our sample, income payments to foreign investors 
tend to exceed earnings on foreign assets.
10 For the group of advanced economies, 
this statistical discrepancy is less evident in the second part of the sample and de 
facto disappears since 2005. 
The exorbitant privilege of the United States is evident in the Charts 2b, 2d 
and 2f. The excess total return is rarely negative, peaking in a few occasions to a 
level close to or above 10 percent, and in most of the years above excess returns 
in Japan and the euro area. Excess returns in Japan are volatile with three large 
negative spikes and only a large positive one above 10 percent (plot 2b). Again, 
all these large annual excess returns are due to capital gains (plot 2f). Yields on 
foreign assets of the United States have consistently exceeded yields on foreign 
liabilities by one or two percentage points (plot 2d). Two interesting stylised facts 
emerge from the comparison with excess yields in Japan and the euro area. First, 
since the mid-1990s, Japan enjoys a privilege similar or superior to that of the 
United States. Second, there seems to be a clear upward trend in the excess yield 
of the euro area. Back in the 1980s, euro area member states had a negative yield 
                                                 
10 See also previous section, in particular footnote 8. 
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differential between foreign assets and liabilities of around two percentage points. 
Since the 1992 EMU crisis, this negative differential begins to shrink, with the 
trend accelerating in the run-up to the launch of the euro in 1999 and fading after 
2000. This is suggestive evidence of the macroeconomic benefits stemming from 
the elimination or compression of risk premia of several euro area member states 
during the convergence process leading to the adoption of the euro.
11 Yet, as 
regards yields obtained from the income balance, euro area member states do not 
enjoy a privilege comparable to that of the United States and Japan.   
In order to provide a more precise quantification of the previous descriptive 
analysis, Table 2 reports summary statistics for excess returns.  On average, total 
returns on foreign liabilities exceed returns on foreign assets by around 150 basis 
points, owing to the negative differential in yields from investment income. These 
negative excess total returns and yields are statistically different from zero at 1 
percent level in the whole cross section and also when splitting the sample 
between advanced and emerging economies. On the contrary, excess rates of 
capital gain are virtually close to zero. The latter are however four times more 
volatile than excess yields (see standard errors) and display a more pronounced 
excess kurtosis. Indeed, there are a few spikes of excess annual rates of capital 
gain (and total returns) of more than 70 percent in absolute value. For instance, 
the largest negative spikes coincide with the Argentinean crisis in 1981-82 and 
with the tech bubble in Finland in 1998-99, whereas the largest positive peaks 
correspond to the 1983 debt crisis in Brazil and the most recent Argentinean crises 
in 1989 and 2002.
12  
The exorbitant privilege of the United States, on the basis of our calculations 
with IMF data, is 335 basis points on average between 1981 and 2007, of which 
around two thirds (207 basis points) due to capital gains and one third (128 basis 
points) to the positive yield differential.
13 Excess returns, yields and rates of 
capital gain of the United States are significantly different from zero at the usual 
statistical confidence levels. On the contrary, the euro area and Japan do not enjoy 
any privilege and, actually, pay more on their foreign liabilities compared with 
what they receive on their foreign assets. In the case of the euro area, the negative 
excess total return is on average 176 basis points, significantly different from zero 
and mainly due to the negative yield differential (128 basis points). For Japan, the 
                                                 
11 See Codogno et al. (2003), for instance, for an analysis of the compression of yield spreads on 
EMU government bonds. 
12 This is due to the large capitalisation and public foreign ownership of Nokia, compared to the 
size of Finland’s economy, resulting in sizeable capital gains for foreign investors and losses for 
the Finnish external position before the burst of the dot-com bubble.  
13 This is virtually in line with the result of Gourinchas and Rey (2005), which is calculated over 
the period 1973-2004.  
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negative excess total return is of a similar size (186 basis points), but not 
statistically different from zero and entirely due to valuation losses.   
The excess return on the net foreign assets of the United States is indeed 
“exorbitant” from a global perspective. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the 
detailed results for each country in our sample, confirming that the United States 
is an outlier. Indeed, only a dozen of countries generate on average positive 
excess total returns on their foreign assets, which are generally much smaller than 
those of the United States and not significantly different from zero. The United 
States is also one of the few countries – together with Switzerland, Japan, Korea 
and India – showing a positive and statistically significant excess yield from the 
income balance. The median excess yield of the United States is the highest in the 
sample. As regards capital gains, instead, there are several countries that managed 
on average to obtain positive differentials larger than that of the United States, but 
with the exception of Australia and Chile, these excess returns were volatile and 
not statistically different from zero.  
Table 2. Excess real returns, yields and rates of capital gain on net foreign assets. 1981-
2007 (percentage) 
Variable N. obs. Mean St. Err. Lower Q Median Upper Q min Max Skewn. Kurt.
All countries r
A - r
L 1231 -1.54 *** 0.29 -5.6 -1.4 2.5 -88.0 85.4 -0.3 18.9
i
A - i
L 1231 -1.52 *** 0.07 -2.9 -1.2 0.0 -14.0 20.0 0.5 10.3
k
A - k
L 1231 -0.02 0.28 -3.9 -0.2 3.5 -79.6 90.5 0.2 21.2
Advanced r
A - r
L 540 -0.91 *** 0.34 -4.1 -0.9 2.0 -75.4 46.6 -1.3 24.2
i
A - i
L 540 -0.84 *** 0.08 -1.8 -0.7 0.5 -9.6 6.0 -0.8 5.2
k
A - k
L 540 -0.08 0.33 -3.2 -0.5 2.9 -77.6 56.2 -1.1 29.7
Emerging r
A - r
L 691 -2.03 *** 0.45 -7.6 -1.9 3.1 -88.0 85.4 0.0 15.6
i
A - i
L 691 -2.05 *** 0.11 -3.5 -2.0 -0.6 -14.0 20.0 1.0 11.1
k
A - k
L 691 0.03 0.43 -4.8 0.0 4.2 -79.6 90.5 0.5 17.1
United States r
A - r
L 27 3.35 *** 0.86 0.1 3.9 6.9 -4.8 11.5 0.0 2.1
i
A - i
L 27 1.28 *** 0.08 1.0 1.3 1.7 0.4 2.1 -0.1 2.2
k
A - k
L 27 2.07 ** 0.82 -1.2 2.5 5.4 -5.5 9.8 0.1 2.0
Euro (10) r
A - r
L 270 -1.76 *** 0.50 -4.5 -1.6 0.9 -75.4 36.0 -2.7 30.3
i
A - i
L 270 -1.28 *** 0.11 -2.2 -0.8 -0.1 -7.5 3.8 -0.9 4.1
k
A - k
L 270 -0.49 0.50 -3.3 -0.7 2.1 -77.6 39.3 -2.9 35.4
Japan r
A - r
L 27 -1.86 1.64 -5.3 -0.5 2.0 -22.0 15.7 -0.4 3.9
i
A - i
L 27 0.80 *** 0.16 0.2 0.7 1.6 -1.4 2.1 -0.4 3.0
k
A - k
L 27 -2.66 * 1.60 -6.4 -1.7 1.6 -22.7 14.0 -0.6 4.0
 




L) and rates of capital gain (k
A-k
L) are calculated according to 
equations (5) to (7) in the main text. Euro (10) includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. See data appendix A.1 for list of countries and definition of groups. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Summing up, over the past decades the United States managed to run positive 
return differentials on net foreign assets. It is not simply the average level of this 
differential that is extraordinary, but also the ability of the United States to 
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achieve it in a consistent manner through time from both investment income and 
capital gains. Other major issuers of international currencies, such as Japan and 
the euro area, are far from this performance, mainly due to average capital losses. 
Indeed, when focussing only on the yield differential from investment income, 
Japan as well as Switzerland – both issuers of international currencies – do not 
fare much worse than the United States. The euro area member states do not enjoy 
a privilege similar to other issuers of international currencies. However, a 
negative yield differential between foreign assets and liabilities of euro area 
countries was significantly eroded in the run-up to EMU accession. It has already 
been discussed in section 2 whether the excess returns on net foreign assets of the 
United States are the outcome of statistical adjustment, measurement errors or true 
superior over-performance of U.S. investors. Here, we do not offer further 
evidence on this debate. In the next section, instead, we investigate the 
contribution of specific asset classes – FDI, equity, debt and other – to excess 
returns on net foreign assets in selected economies. 
6.  Exorbitant privilege: return or composition effect? 
Gurinchas and Rey (2005) provide a break-up of excess total real returns in the 
United States in a return and a composition effect. The first effect gauges the 
importance of differential returns between assets and liabilities within each asset 
class, i.e. for FDI, equity, debt and other investments, separately. The second 
effect, instead, measures how the different weight of various asset classes between 
gross foreign assets and liabilities may generate excess returns assuming different 
average returns from each asset class. For instance, in the case of the United 
States, gross foreign liabilities are dominated by low-yield debt and other 
investment (trade credits, loans, currency and deposits), whereas the composition 
of gross foreign assets is more balanced between low-yield instruments and risky 
assets such as FDI and equity, with the latter supposed to generate superior 
returns.
14 This second effect therefore is supposed to capture the impact of the 
asymmetric composition of gross assets and liabilities and, in the special case of 
the United States, the benefit of being a “levered investor”.  As previously noted, 
the main finding of Gourinchas and Rey (2005) is that the composition effect 
increased significantly over time in the case of the United States, explaining one 
quarter (86 basis points) of the average annual excess total real return (332 basis 
points) between 1973 and 2004.  
                                                 
14 The ratio of debt and other investment to total gross foreign liabilities in the United States is 
relatively stable, averaging almost 70 percent between 1980 and 2007. The ratio of debt and other 
investment to total gross foreign assets was equal to 70 percent back in the 1980s, but 
progressively declined over the years to around 45 percent. 
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Formally, the excess return obtained in equation (7) may be decomposed as: 
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(10) 
where  j α  and  j λ  are the weights of each asset class, j, in total assets and 
liabilities. The asset classes are FDI, equity, debt and other investment. In the case 
of gross foreign assets, official reserves are lumped together with other 
investment.
15 In the calculation of the return effect, differential returns within 
each asset class are weighted by their average share in total assets and liabilities; 
when computing the composition effect, instead, average returns by asset class are 
weighted by the relative composition of assets and liabilities. 
We use this formula (10) to extend and deepen the analysis of Gourinchas 
and Rey (2005). First, we extend this decomposition to other major advanced 
economies for which it was possible to obtain disaggregated data on both income 
flows and investment positions, including in particular the euro area consolidated 
external position and transactions since 1999. Second, we deepen the analysis 
further refining the decomposition (10) in the two components of excess total 
returns: yields from investment income and capital gains from asset price and 
exchange rate movements (see equation 7). It will be then clear whether, for 
instance, a positive return effect is due to superior performance in generating 
earnings from investment abroad compared to payments to foreign investors or 
due to increases in the domestic currency market value of investment abroad 
compared to inward investment by foreigners.  
Table 3 presents the detailed decomposition of excess returns for the United 
States, Germany, Japan and the euro area, with annual data averaged over three 
different periods. Returns by asset class are available from 1986 for the first two 
countries, from 1996 for Japan and since 2000 for the euro area. According to our 
calculations, differently from Gourinchas and Rey (2005), it is not possible to 
identify any positive contribution of the composition effect to total excess real 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, the breakdown of the income balance does not include a separate item for 
earnings stemming from the investment of official reserves. In theory, one should include those 
earnings in the appropriate category (e.g. dividend for equity, debt income or other income); 
however, in many cases, these earnings are reported by the authorities under “other income” to 
protect the confidentiality of these data. 
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returns in the United States.
16 Between 1986 and 2007, the composition effect is 
actually negative (-0.8%) and is entirely due to the relative short position in debt 
securities, which provides a large negative contribution (-1.7%) that is not offset 
by the positive composition effect of other categories.
17  
The exorbitant privilege of the United States is instead the result of an 
extraordinary return effect (+5.1%), i.e. the better performance of U.S. investment 
abroad with respect to foreign investment in the U.S. across all categories. Capital 
gains explain two thirds of this return effect between 1986 and 2007 (+3.3%), but 
their contribution is even higher in the most recent period (2000-2007). In turn, 
capital gains stem principally by superior differential returns in the debt and 
equity categories. According to Curcuru et al. (2008) this superior performance is 
only the outcome of measurement errors, in particular in the case of asset-backed 
securities.  Positive yield differentials explain the rest of the return effect (+1.8%). 
The decomposition emphasises that this return effect for yields is almost entirely 
due to the income stemming from U.S. direct investment abroad exceeding the 
income paid to service foreign direct investment in the United States (see section 
2 for a discussion). 
Excess total returns in the two other major economies in Table 3, Germany 
and Japan are negative between 1986 and 2007. It is possible, however, to 
distinguish an improvement in the most recent period. In Germany, during the 
period 1986-2007, a negative cross-border differential total return (-1.1%) is 
explained by the return effect (-1.4%) on the back of net capital losses on FDI, 
equity and other investment. Interestingly, since 2000, the situation is reversed: 
the return effect turned positive whereas the composition effect is slightly 
negative. In Japan, the decomposition of excess returns is available only starting 
from 1996. Again, as in the case of Germany, there is a noticeable improvement 
in the total excess return when focussing on the last decade. In particular, since 
2000, Japan enjoyed an “almost exorbitant” privilege of 3 percentage points. It is 
worth noting how the debt category plays an important role in the case of Japan, 
with a positive return and composition effect.
18  
                                                 
16 In this paper, both data and time-dimension are different from Gourinchas and Rey (2005). It is 
also evident from Table 3 that in some cases results may change significantly across different 
time-periods. 
17 Indeed, the share of debt securities on total U.S. foreign liabilities is on average 25 percentage 
points larger than the share of debt securities on total U.S. foreign assets. Average 
(assets/liabilities) real yields on debt securities hovered between 3 to 4 percent, whereas average 
total returns (including capital gains) stayed between 6 to 8 percent. It is important to note that 
these average (assets/liabilities) total returns on debt securities are indeed lower than those on 
equity – as expected – but higher than average total returns on FDI.  
18 The decomposition of excess returns of other major advanced countries – United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Canada and Australia – is available in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Decomposition of excess returns on net foreign assets: return versus composition 





















Excess return 4.3 1.4 2.9 4.7 1.3 3.4 5.5 1.5 4.0
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 - Debt -1.7 -0.9 -0.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.1 -2.0 -0.6 -0.7
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Excess return -1.8 0.9 -2.7 1.0 1.6 -0.6 3.0 1.8 1.3
Return effect … … … 1.4 0.9 0.4 3.0 1.2 1.8
 - FDI … … … -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4
 - Equity … … … 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.6 0.7 0.9
 - Debt … … … 1.7 0.7 1.1 2.4 0.8 1.6
 - Other … … … -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3
Composition effect … … … -0.4 0.7 -1.1 0.1 0.6 -0.5
 - FDI … … … 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.6 0.5 0.2
 - Equity … … … -1.5 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7
 - Debt … … … 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.0





















Excess return … … … … … … -0.8 -0.1 -0.7
Return effect … … … … … … -0.9 -0.2 -0.8
 -  F D I ……… ……… - 0 . 6 0 . 0 - 0 . 6
 - Equity … … … … … … -0.2 -0.2 0.0
 -  D e b t ……… ……… - 0 . 1 0 . 2 - 0 . 3
 - Other … … … … … … 0.0 -0.1 0.1
Composition effect … … … … … … 0.1 0.1 0.0
 -  F D I ……… ……… 0 . 1 0 . 1 - 0 . 2
 -  E q u i t y ……… ……… 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 2
 -  D e b t ……… ……… 0 . 0 - 0 . 1 0 . 1









L) and rates of capital gain (k
A-k
L) are decomposed according to eq. (10):  
( )
()() ()
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where αj and λj are the weights of each asset class, j, in total assets and liabilities. The first term on the right-hand-side of 
(10) is the return effect, i.e. the weighted impact of excess returns within each asset class, and the second term is the 
composition effect, i.e. the excess return deriving from being long or short in each asset class in relative terms.  
Finally, since 2000, it is possible to obtain the excess returns of the euro area 
as a whole, using consolidated external positions and transactions. Since the 
introduction of the common currency, the euro area obtained from its investment 
abroad less than what it pays to foreign investors in the euro area, once capital 
gains are included (-0.8%). This negative differential total return is almost entirely 
accounted for by capital losses, whereas the negative pure yield differential is 
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very small. In turn, a negative return effect for FDI and debt securities explains 
these capital losses. Comparing these losses with gains in the United States and 
Japan over the same period, one may deduce that a net transfer of wealth across 
the Atlantic and the Pacific may have taken place since the burst of the dot-com 
bubble. However, the previous analysis stressed that capital gains and losses are 
rather volatile and their impact on net foreign assets may be properly gauged only 
over a long-time span. It is therefore too soon to generalise and extrapolate these 
short-term trends. 
Overall, the detailed decomposition of excess returns showed that the role of 
the United States as “levered investor” did not contribute to its exorbitant 
privilege, at least over the past two decades. The privilege is instead fully 
explained by excess returns within each asset class. The composition effect – i.e. 
the impact of asymmetries in the composition of foreign assets and liabilities on 
excess returns – is also relatively smaller than the return effect in the other major 
economies issuing international currencies. The question of the impact of the 
composition of net foreign assets on excess returns may be tackled from a 
different angle, analysing the whole cross-section of excess returns and 
controlling whether countries with higher leverage – defined as a higher share of 
risky investment on the asset side compared to liabilities – tend to have higher 
excess returns. This is the purpose of the next section. 
7.  Excess returns: exchange rate, leverage and country risk 
The detailed decomposition of the excess returns on net foreign assets in the 
United States revealed the absence of the role of “leverage” in generating excess 
returns. Is this still the case from a cross-country comparison? Are there other 
variables that can explain excess returns? Data limitations do not allow running 
calculations for all countries in our sample similar to those in the previous section. 
This limitation may be circumvented through a panel analysis of the potential 
determinants of excess returns. Following the literature (see section 2), it is 
possible to identify three variables that may affect excess returns: the exchange 
rate, leverage and country risk.  
Exchange rate and excess returns 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) show that there is negative relationship between 
the real appreciation of one currency and real returns on foreign assets or 
liabilities. This is simply the result of higher inflation and the valuation effect of 
exchange rates changes on foreign assets and liabilities, which are denominated in 
foreign currency. A nominal appreciation, in fact, reduces the domestic currency 
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return and vice versa in the case of depreciation. This effect is directly 
proportional to the foreign currency share of total assets or liabilities. The higher 
the share of foreign assets (liabilities) denominated in foreign currency, the higher 
the negative impact of exchange rate appreciation on the domestic currency return 
on assets (liabilities). In theory, the overall impact of exchange rate changes on 
the “excess” return, i.e. the differential between the return on foreign assets and 
the return on foreign liabilities, is undetermined, depending on whether the 
foreign currency share of total assets is substantially different from that of 
liabilities. In practice, however, the foreign currency share of total foreign assets 
is generally larger than the foreign currency share of total foreign liabilities.
19 As 
a consequence of this asymmetry, returns on assets are more sensitive to exchange 
rate changes than returns on liabilities. A nominal appreciation (depreciation) of 
the domestic currency reduces (raises) the returns on assets more than the returns 
on liabilities and decreases (increases) the “excess” return.
20 A simple numerical 
example will clarify this important point.  
Let us assume that a country has both foreign assets and liabilities equal to 
100, measured in domestic currency terms.
21 Liabilities are all in domestic 
currency. Foreign assets are by half denominated in domestic currency (50 units) 
and by the other half denominated in foreign currency (50 units). For the sake of 
simplicity, income flows and changes in asset prices are assumed to be absent and 
the only change is a devaluation of the domestic currency increasing by 10 
percent the price of the foreign currency in domestic currency terms. This will 
bring about a capital gain of +5 in foreign assets (from 50 to 55 units) and a return 
on total assets of 5 percent. The return on liabilities will remain equal to zero, as 
there is no exchange rate effect. The “excess” return resulting from the 
devaluation of the domestic currency is therefore equal to 5 percent; a negative 
relationship between the exchange rate and excess returns.   
                                                 
19 According to the estimates of Lane and Shambaugh (2007), on average, the share of foreign 
assets denominated in foreign currency is 30 percentage points higher than the share of foreign 
liabilities denominated in foreign currency. There are only very few instances (e.g. Austria) where 
the latter is higher than the former. This is because, normally, the bulk of foreign assets are 
denominated in foreign currency, since only the issuers of international currencies have foreign 
assets (usually only debt securities, trade credits and deposits) denominated in their own domestic 
currency. Instead, for foreign liabilities, the portion accounted for by FDI and equity is by 
definition denominated in domestic currency, whereas the remaining part, debt and other 
investment, may be potentially denominated in foreign-currency, in particular in the case of 
dollarized emerging markets. Countries issuing international currencies may have a larger share of 
domestic currency foreign assets with respect to other countries; however, they also tend to issue 
an even larger share of liabilities to foreigners in domestic currency. Therefore, eventually, also 
issuers of international currencies have a larger ratio of foreign currency assets to total foreign 
assets compared to the similar ratio for foreign liabilities.  
20 In real terms the negative relationship is even stronger due to the impact of domestic inflation. 
21 All figures in this example refer to domestic currency units and domestic currency returns. 
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A small modification of the previous example shows how the impact of 
exchange rates movements on excess returns crucially depends on the foreign 
currency share of assets and liabilities. In addition, it clarifies that the relationship 
holds irrespective of the size of gross foreign assets and liabilities. Similarly to the 
previous case, one may assume that foreign assets are equal to 100 domestic 
currency units and 50 percent of them are denominated in foreign currency. Now, 
however, foreign liabilities are assumed to be much larger and equal to 1000 
domestic currency units, of which 200 units denominated in foreign currency. As 
in the previous example, the foreign currency share of total foreign assets (50%) is 
greater than the foreign currency share of total foreign liabilities (20%). A 
depreciation of the domestic currency by 10 percent will generate a return on 
assets of 5 percent and a return on liabilities of 2 percent (+20 capital gain on 
liabilities), corresponding to an excess return of 3 percent.  The relationship 
between the exchange rate and excess returns is again negative; even though the 
effect of the devaluation is lower than in the previous case. Turning to the size of 
foreign assets and liabilities, in the first example, the country was long in foreign 
currency (+50) and the overall valuation gain of the devaluation was therefore 
positive (+5). In this second example, instead, the net foreign currency position is 
negative (-150), resulting in a valuation loss (-15 = +5 - 20). The devaluation 
generated a “positive” excess return and a “negative” valuation gain. The sign of 
the relationship between excess returns and the exchange rate depends on the net 
relative foreign currency exposure, in terms of foreign currency shares between 
assets and liabilities. The sign of the relationship between valuation gains and the 
exchange rate depends on the net absolute foreign currency position. Excess 
returns and valuation gains are two distinct concepts that should not be confused. 
Leverage and excess returns 
A levered investor, a country, shorting low-yield securities (debt and other 
investment in the balance of payments) and taking a long position in risky foreign 
assets (FDI and equity) should be able to generate a positive excess return, as long 
as risk-taking investment is remunerated by higher average returns. In this case, 
the variable measuring the assumption of risk, i.e. the leverage, is the ratio of FDI 
and equity assets to total foreign assets minus the similar ratio for total foreign 
liabilities. Formally, assume that foreign assets and liabilities may be divided in 
two categories: risky assets and liabilities, A
risk and L
risk, respectively, and safe 
one, A
safe and L
safe. The total return on assets, r
A, or liabilities, r
L, is a weighted 





J risk J risk risk J safe J safe safe
J tt t tt t
t risk safe
tt t t






=+    (11)
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where the letter J = A, L indicates whether the equality refers to assets or liabilities 
and the other variables are defined as in section 3. The excess return may be 
rewritten as: 
( ) ( )
,, , ,
11 1 1 (1 ) (1 )
A L A risk A safe L risk L safe
tt t t t t t t t t rr r r r r αα λλ −− − − −= + − − + −    (12)
where the Greek letter, α (λ) denotes the weight of risky assets (liabilities) on total 
assets (liabilities).  Now, assuming that the return on risky (safe) investment is the 
same on the asset and liability side:  
,, ,, ˆˆ   and     
risk A risk L risk safe A safe L safe
tt t tt t rr r rr r ≡≡ ≡≡     
then, the terms in equation (12) may be rearranged to obtain: 
( )( ) 11 ˆˆ
A L risk safe
tt t t t t rr r r α λ −− −= − −    (13)
This equation shows that if  ˆˆ
risk safe
tt rr > , which is the underlying assumption of the 
leverage hypothesis, then the higher the ratio of risky assets to total assets in the 
previous period,  1 t α − ,compared to the ratio of risky liabilities to total liabilities in 
the previous period, 1 t λ − , the higher the excess return at time t. In practice, if 
detailed data on the income balance were to be available for all countries, one 
would be able to measure returns by major asset classes (FDI, equity, debt and 
other investment) and compare them, without resorting to any assumption. 
Unfortunately, disaggregated income balance data are available only for a few 
countries or the last few years. The country panel regression will indirectly test 
whether  ˆˆ
risk safe
tt rr >  holds in the sample once ( ) 11 tt α λ − − −  is changing. 
Risk and excess returns 
Finally, the U.S. excess return on net foreign assets has been justified on the 
grounds of lower overall risk of investing in the United States compared to the 
rest of the world. It is therefore interesting to check whether lower country risk is 
associated with higher excess returns and vice versa in our panel of countries.  
The empirical model 
Two alternative models are eventually tested, which differ in the specification of 
the exchange rate impact on excess returns, keeping instead a similar treatment of 
leverage and country risk. In the first model, the relationship to be tested is the 
following:  
,1 , 2 , ,, 1 , ,  * it it it it it it it y DRER DRER FC LEV RiskR α ββ γ δ ε − =+ + + + + 
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where the dependent variable, y, is the excess real total return or, alternatively, the 
excess real yield or the excess real rate of capital gain; DRERt is the difference of 
the (log) real effective (trade-weighted) exchange rate between time t and t-1. 
()
AL
tt t FC FC FC =− is the difference between the ratio of foreign currency assets 
to total assets, 
A




22 Following the previous discussion, the sign of the coefficient 
associated with the change in the real exchange rate interacted with the relative 
foreign currency share is expected to be negative, β2<0, while the change in the 
real exchange rate alone should have an impact close to zero β1~0. In general, we 
would expect the marginal effect of DRERt to be negative: ( ) 12 *0 t FC ββ + < .  It 
is important to keep in mind that exchange rate movements should influence the 
capital gain part of the excess return, whereas excess yields from the income 
balance may be less sensitive, or perhaps not sensitive at all, to changes in the real 
exchange rate.  
LEVt-1 is our measure of leverage at time t-1 ( ) 11 tt α λ − − −  and, in particular, is 
equal to the ratio of FDI and equity assets (the risky investment) to total foreign 
assets minus the same ratio for total foreign liabilities. The coefficient associated 
with this variable is expected to be positive, γ>0, if leveraged investors are to be 
compensated for higher risk taking, in particular for excess rates of capital gain.
23 
Finally, RiskR is a risk rating obtained from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), which comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, 
financial, and economic. Apart from its rich qualitative dimension, one of the 
main advantages of this index is to have a rather long time-dimension, being 
available for all countries in our sample as far as back 1984.
24 The higher the 
rating, the lower the risk associated to the particular country (see Appendix A.1 
for a detailed description of this indicator). The coefficient associated with this 
variable is therefore expected to be positive, δ>0, as low risk countries, or 
countries improving their risk-profile, are expected to pay relatively lower returns 
on their foreign liabilities and hence obtain a higher excess return.  
                                                 
22 Data on the currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities are estimates from Lane and 
Shambaugh (2007), which are available from 1990 to 2004. The foreign currency shares are kept 
constant at the 1990 value for the period 1980-1989 and at the 2004 value for the period 2005-
2007, i.e. for those periods in our sample that are not covered by these estimates.  
23 As in the case of exchange rate changes, the impact of leverage should be more visible on excess 
rates of capital gain compared to excess yields from the income balance, since the return on equity 
is mainly due to capital gains and only residually to dividends, which are recorded in the income 
balance. Indeed, a casual inspection of yields by asset class, when detailed income balance data are 
available, shows that average yields on FDI (reinvested earning, distributed dividends and 
repatriated profits, income on debt) are the highest, followed by yields on debt and other 
investment. Average yields on equity are usually ranking below all other categories.  
24 The index is kept constant at the 1984 level in the previous years, back to 1981. 
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A second model has also been tested to measure the valuation effect of 
exchange rate movements more precisely, including an effective exchange rate 
that takes into account currency exposure. In the previous model, the exchange 
rate is the usual trade-weighted exchange rate, which may only approximate the 
currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities. These international 
currency exposures have been estimated by Lane and Shambaugh (2007) and used 
to create financial exchange rates. In a similar fashion, I constructed a real 
Finance Weighted Index for assets (FWI
A) and liabilities (FWI
L) as a geometric 
weighted average of bilateral real (CPI deflated) exchange rates against five major 
international currencies (US dollar, British pound euro, Japanese yen and Swiss 
franc) and the domestic currency, where the currency weights are derived from 
the dataset of Lane and Shambaugh (2007).
25 For its part, the domestic currency 
generates no variation in the index as for a fixed exchange rate. As previously 
noted, the weight of the domestic currency in total foreign liabilities is higher than 
in the case of foreign assets. Indeed, the measured standard deviation of FWI
A is 
approximately 30 percent larger than that of FWI
L. Eventually, in order to 
estimate the impact of valuation effects on excess returns, the following 
explanatory variable has been constructed:  
A L
tt t DFWI DFWI DFWI ≡−    
which is the net change in the (log) real Finance Weighted Index, measured as the 
difference between the change, between t and t-1, in the (log) real Finance 
Weighted Index for assets (DFWI
A) and the change in the (log) real Finance 
Weighted Index for liabilities (DFWI
L). This finance-weighted index should better 
gauge the valuation impact of exchange rate changes on excess returns compared 
to the real effective, trade-weighted, exchange rate. The model in equation (14) is 
re-specified in the following form:  
,, , 1 , ,   it it it it it y DFWI LEV RiskR α βγ δ ε − = ++ + +  
   0;    0;   0 β γδ <>>  
(15)
Empirical results 
Equation (14) and (15) are estimated for our panel of 48 countries over the period 
1981-2007.
26 The panel is strongly balanced with only six transition economies 
                                                 
25 Weights are changed and the resulting series chain-linked in 1999 with the introduction of the 
euro. They are the average currency shares between 1990 and 1998 for the first part of the sample 
until 1998, and the average currency shares between 1999 and 2004 in the second part of the 
sample. 
26 One country had to be dropped, Bulgaria, since there is no information on the currency 
composition of foreign assets and liabilities. 
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having observations for less than half of the period under examination. As a first 
step, traditional static panel linear methods are applied to estimate excess returns, 
yields and rates of capital gain. In a second phase, we apply instead a dynamic 
panel estimator to check the robustness of the preliminary step.   










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DRER -0.1717 -0.0024 -0.0060 -0.1465 0.0180 0.0172 -0.0252 -0.0204 -0.0206
(0.3178) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.1693) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.3028) (0.0169) (0.0167)
DRER*FC -0.4015 -0.4938 ** -0.4880 ** -0.0573 -0.0444 -0.0471 -0.3443 -0.4494 ** -0.4329 **
(0.9620) (0.2124) (0.2029) (0.5125) (0.0396) (0.0392) (0.9167) (0.2172) (0.2052)
LEV (-1) 0.0650 ** -0.0070 0.0374 ** 0.0196 -0.0039 0.0034 0.0454 -0.0031 0.0231
(0.0302) (0.0318) (0.0179) (0.0161) (0.0118) (0.0096) (0.0288) (0.0315) (0.0151)
RiskR 0.0019 -0.0851 -0.0213 0.0709 *** 0.0023 0.0177 -0.0689 -0.0874 -0.0672 **
(0.0436) (0.0651) (0.0287) (0.0232) (0.0251) (0.0204) (0.0416) (0.0596) (0.0277)
Const. -0.0132 0.0470 0.0028 -0.0664 *** -0.0171 -0.0285 * 0.0533 0.0641 0.0508 **
(0.0338) (0.0468) (0.0225) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0161) (0.0322) (0.0427) (0.0218)
R
2 Within 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.021 0.024 0.023
R
2 Between 0.164 0.002 0.146 0.284 0.009 0.235 0.108 0.044 0.095
R










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DFWI -0.6702 -0.3314 *** -0.3415 *** -0.2096 0.0259 0.0222 -0.4606 -0.3572 *** -0.3543 ***
(0.4900) (0.1071) (0.1017) (0.2730) (0.0324) (0.0318) (0.4655) (0.0929) (0.0878)
LEV (-1) 0.0629 ** 0.0001 0.0416 ** 0.0204 -0.0031 0.0040 0.0424 0.0032 0.0266
(0.0282) (0.0334) (0.0191) (0.0157) (0.0119) (0.0097) (0.0268) (0.0333) (0.0164)
RiskR -0.0026 -0.0838 -0.0209 0.0653 *** 0.0036 0.0186 -0.0679 * -0.0874 -0.0683 **
(0.0399) (0.0624) (0.0276) (0.0222) (0.0244) (0.0198) (0.0379) (0.0578) (0.0277)
Const. -0.0094 0.0465 0.0029 -0.0620 *** -0.0180 -0.0291 * 0.0526 * 0.0645 0.0520 **
(0.0307) (0.0447) (0.0218) (0.0171) (0.0179) (0.0156) (0.0292) (0.0415) (0.0219)
R
2 Within 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.021 0.022 0.022
R
2 Between 0.159 0.001 0.146 0.260 0.000 0.236 0.117 0.061 0.108
R
2 Total 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.047 0.003 0.081 0.026 0.024 0.027
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
N. obs. 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215 1215  
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equations (14) and (15) in the main text, according to three 
different methods: OLS between regression on country means (BE); OLS fixed-effects regression (FE) and GLS 
random-effects (RE). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for fixed-effects and random-effects 
estimations allow for clustering of residuals by country. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Table 4 reports the results of the panel estimation according to three different 
methods: OLS between regression on country means; OLS regression allowing for 
country fixed-effects and GLS random-effects assuming that individual effects 
and regressors are uncorrelated. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis that 
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individual effects are all equal to zero in the fixed-effects estimations. At the same 
time, in most of the cases, the Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
fixed-effects and random-effects estimates are statistically different and, hence, it 
is also feasible to study random-effects estimates.
27 The upper panel A shows the 
estimation of the first model including the interaction of the real trade-weighted 
exchange rate with the relative share of foreign currency assets and liabilities. The 
lower panel B displays instead the result of the regressions including the real 
financial exchange rate, i.e. the index weighted with the currency composition of 
foreign assets and liabilities.  
The signs of the estimated coefficients are in general consistent through the 
various estimations and in line with theoretical predictions, in particular as regards 
the impact of the exchange rate and with the exception of the country risk 
variable. In particular, one may note that, in the first model, the coefficient of the 
real trade-weighted exchange rate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
according to fixed or random effects estimates, only when interacted with the 
relative foreign currency share. For a country with a foreign currency share of 
foreign assets that is 30 percentage points higher than the foreign currency share 
of foreign liabilities – corresponding to the sample mean of this variable, FC = 0.3 
– an appreciation by 10 percent (close to one standard deviation) in the real 
effective exchange rate is associated with a decrease in the excess real total return 
by around 150 basis points (columns 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 4).
28 As 
expected, the exchange rate channel works through capital gains (columns 8 and 
9), whereas the impact on excess yields turned out to be not significantly different 
from zero (columns 5 and 6). Using the net real Finance Weighted Index, instead 
of the trade-weighted exchange rate, it is possible to obtain similar qualitative 
results (see Panel B). The main difference is that DFWI is three times less volatile 
than DRER and the associated coefficient comparatively higher. An appreciation 
of the net index by 3.5 percent (close to one standard deviation) would decrease 
excess returns by around 120 basis points. Coefficients are now significant at the 
1 percent level. 
The impact of leverage is positive and statistically significant for excess total 
real returns only in between regressions and random-effects, but not in the fixed-
effects estimates. An increase by ten percentage points in the share of FDI and 
equity in total assets relative to the same share in total liabilities would be 
                                                 
27 In the case of excess yields, however, the Hausman test suggests that estimated random effect 
coefficients in column 6 of Table 4 may be biased.  
28 Table A.4 in the appendix shows the result of the regression of the first model without the 
interaction term DRER*FC, including simply the change in the real exchange rate. As expected, 
the coefficient associated with DRER is still negative, even though relatively smaller in absolute 
value (around -0.075) and only significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
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associated with higher excess total returns in the order of 40 to 60 basis points. 
This variable is not statistically significant when regressing excess yields or 
excess rates of capital gain. Finally, country risk has an ambiguous and not 
statistically significant impact on excess total returns. This is the result of two 
opposite forces. On the one hand, as predicted, larger excess yields are associated 
with higher ratings (i.e. lower risk); on the other hand, excess rates of capital gain 
are negatively related with ratings.
29  
The panel regressions explain only a minimal fraction of the variability of 
excess total returns and rates of capital gain (R
2 is equal to maximum 2%) and do 
marginally better in the case of the excess yields without fixed-effects. Indeed, as 
noted in the previous sections, total returns and capital gains are more volatile 
than yields. Our control variables cannot explain the variability “within” each 
country series. In the case of less volatile excess yields, instead, panel regressions 
perform better, explaining 20 to 30 percent of the “between” variability across 
countries. 
Robustness checks 
A number of checks have been performed to test the robustness of the basic static 
regressions. These include the control for potential dynamic misspecifications in 
the panel, the use of nominal variables in domestic currency terms in order to see 
whether the relation between real exchange rate and real excess returns is driven 
only by inflation and, finally, the robustness of results splitting the sample 
between advanced economies and emerging markets. 
Table 4 provided a suggestive and neat picture of the role of potential 
determinants of excess returns. However, coefficients obtained from traditional 
static panel one-way estimators are traditionally subject to two types of bias: (i) a 
bias stemming from residual correlation in a dynamic setting and (ii) a bias 
deriving from the imposition of homogenous slopes when the time-dimension T is 
large. As regards the first type of bias, indeed, the Wooldridge (2002) test for 
panel models cannot reject the presence of serial correlation in the residuals of our 
first regressions. The relatively large time-dimension of our sample should lessen 
the impact of the inconsistency generated by residual correlation, which is of the 
order 1/T (Nickell, 1981). There is however a second type of bias that is generated 
by the imposition of common slope coefficients across groups in models with 
lagged dependent variables, when T is large (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In order 
                                                 
29 This is also consistent with the evidence from Table 2 in section 5, which shows that average 
excess yields for (low-rating, high-risk) emerging markets are much lower than for the group of 
(high-rating, low risk) advanced economies. Excess rates of capital gain are instead on average 
slightly higher for emerging markets than for advanced economies. 
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to deal with these potential misspecifications of our model, we present a second 
set of results obtained with the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999) allowing for common long-run slope coefficients, but 
different short-term interactions, across countries.
30   









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DRER -0.0706 *** -0.0427 0.0442 *** -0.0031 -0.0770 *** -0.0519 **
(0.0261) (0.0322) (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0216) (0.0251)
DRER*FC -0.1346 0.1611 *** -0.1528
(0.1249) (0.0478) (0.1044)
DFWI -0.2242 *** 0.1260 *** -0.2570 ***
(0.0769) (0.0300) (0.0716)
LEV(-1) -0.0391 ** -0.0403 ** -0.0318 * -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0190 -0.0222 -0.0090
(0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0170)
RiskR -0.2329 *** -0.2341 *** -0.2638 *** 0.0350 ** 0.0431 *** 0.0519 *** -0.2182 *** -0.2127 *** -0.2486 ***
(0.0393) (0.0386) (0.0399) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0349) (0.0343) (0.0366)
Const. 0.1441 *** 0.1453 *** 0.1726 *** -0.0165 *** -0.0178 *** -0.0179 *** 0.1555 *** 0.1514 *** 0.1852 ***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0096)
Error corr. (φ) -0.9453 *** -0.9438 *** -0.9709 *** -0.3594 *** -0.3406 *** -0.3183 *** -0.9866 *** -0.9820 *** -1.0115 ***
(0.0376) (0.0398) (0.0350) (0.0476) (0.0474) (0.0329) (0.0419) (0.0436) (0.0376)
LogL 1530.3 1573.7 1544.5 3969.5 4002.7 3989.2 1586.2 1628.7 1594.9
C o u n t r i e s 4 84 84 8 4 84 84 8 4 84 84 8
N. obs. 1164 1161 1167 1164 1161 1167 1164 1161 1167
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equation (14) and (15) in the main text with the Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) maximum-likelihood estimator of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) with the following reparametrisation 
of our equations: 
101 1  () tt t t t yy x x φ θθ β ε − ∆= − − −∆+ 
where the subscript for individual countries and additional regressors have been eliminated to simplify the notation. The 
PMG estimator imposes common long-run slope coefficients (θ) but different short-term interactions (β) across 
countries. φ is an error correction term equal to (λ-1), where λ is the first-order autoregressive coefficient. Standard-
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the results of this second set of estimations, reporting the long-
run coefficients associated with the explanatory variables. For comparison, 
                                                 
30 In our case, equation (14) and (15) are transformed in an autoregressive distributed lag model, 
allowing for one-lag in the dependent and the explanatory variables: 
11 1   tt t t t yy x x α λβ βε −0 − =+ + + +  
where, in order to keep the notation simple, we dropped the subscript, i, for the individual country 
and included only one regressor. This equation is reparametrised in the following error correction 











− ∆= − − −∆+
+
=− 1 = =
−−
 
where φ indicates the error-correction term and θ1 denotes the long-run coefficient for the impact 
of x on y, whereas β1 is the short-run coefficient. Long-run coefficients are constrained to be the 
same across different countries, whereas the short-run coefficients are allowed to vary. It therefore 
implies a convergence of the model only over the long-run. 
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regressions including simply the real effective exchange rates are included (see 
columns 1, 4 and 7). It is possible to appreciate a similar pattern in the sign of the 
coefficient associated with the various measures of real exchange rate changes. 
This coefficient is negative when the dependent variable is the excess total return 
or the excess rate of capital gain, positive instead for excess yields. The absolute 
size of the impact on excess returns and excess rates of capital gain, although, is 
estimated to be lower compared to static panel regressions. In particular, 
focussing on the finance-weighted exchange rate (column 3), a real depreciation 
of the domestic currency by 3.5 percent, one standard deviation, produces a 
positive excess return of almost 80 basis points, which is approximately two thirds 
of the impact that was estimated through static panels. The impact of country risk 
is also consistent across static and dynamic regressions. This effect is positive for 
excess yields and negative for excess total returns and rates of capital gain. In the 
dynamic setting the absolute size and statistical significance of estimated 
parameters for country risk are magnified compared to static regressions. The 
major difference of dynamic panel estimations compared to static ones lies in the 
effect of leverage on excess returns, which is now negative and statistically 
significant in the case of excess returns (see columns 1 to 3). Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that this relationship is not robust across different estimation 
methods.  
Equation (7) in section 3 shows that the excess return will be dampened 
down by domestic inflation. One could wonder whether the negative coefficient 
for the real exchange rate, where domestic prices are at the numerator, is driven 
simply by inflation. Table A.5 in the appendix reports the result of the previous 
robust dynamic panel regressions using “nominal” domestic currency excess 
returns (yields and rates of capital gain) as dependent variables and “nominal” 
effective exchange rates and indices as regressors. These nominal variables are 
much more volatile weakening the statistical relationship, which is less clear cut 
when using the trade-weighted exchange rate. However, when using the nominal 
Finance Weighted Index (DNFWI), which properly measures currency exposure, 
the coefficient is again negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
confirming the presence of a valuation channel due to exchange rate movements. 
As a further robustness check, the sample has been split in advanced and 
emerging economies, running similar static and dynamic panel regressions, 
separately, for the two groups of countries. These results do not show any 
dramatic difference with the outcome of regressions across the full sample, in 
particular as regards the signs of the coefficients, even though the statistical 
significance of estimated coefficients may vary (see Tables A.6 - A.9 in the 
Appendix). The results of static panel regressions show that there is no major 
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difference in the estimated effect of changes in the real exchange rate on excess 
returns and rates of capital gain between advanced and emerging market 
economies. Interestingly, the effect of the risk rating explanatory variable is large 
and significant across advanced economies, but not across emerging markets. The 
sign and statistical significance of the coefficients measuring the role of leverage 
is different across different estimation methods, further weakening the case for a 
positive association between this variable and excess returns (Table A.6 and A.7). 
As regards dynamic panels, it is interesting to note again the negative effect of 
higher risk rating on excess total return, mainly driven by capital gains. The 
negative effect of changes in real exchange rates on the excess rates of capital 
gain is particular evident in the case of emerging markets and when using the 
financial exchange rate as regressor (Table A.8 and A.9). 
Overall, the thorough analysis of the potential determinants of excess returns 
between foreign assets and liabilities delivers a number of rather clear and 
consistent messages. First, there is a negative effect of changes in the exchange 
rate on excess returns, which is transmitted through capital gains and is 
particularly evident when using financial exchange rates that properly account for 
currency exposure. Second, there is only tentative evidence that higher leverage is 
positively associated with higher excess returns. A number of specifications, 
actually, deliver the opposite result. Finally, countries with better risk rating 
benefit from higher excess yields, i.e. they have a better income balance compared 
to countries with a similar net foreign position; nevertheless, they tend to suffer 
from an inferior relative performance in terms of capital gains, which dominates 
the yield effect and, eventually, results in lower excess total returns. 
8.  Concluding remarks 
This paper analysed excess returns on net foreign assets from a global perspective, 
studying a sample of 49 advanced and emerging market economies over the 
period 1981–2007. In particular, the excess total return is decomposed and studied 
in its two main components: yields from the investment income balance and 
capital gains from changes in asset prices and exchange rates. The investment 
income is more important than capital gains in imparting a drift to net foreign 
assets over the long term, whereas capital gains transmit their short-term volatility 
to total returns. 
This study confirms that the excess return on net foreign assets of the United 
States, more than 330 basis points per year between 1981 and 2007, is indeed 
exorbitant from a global perspective, larger than in other countries, consistently 
through time, and statistically significant. One third of this excess return is 
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accounted for by a positive yield differential from investment income and two 
thirds by capital gains. At least as regards yields from the investment income, 
other major issuers of international currencies, such as Japan and Switzerland, 
enjoy positive differential returns almost similar to those of the United States. The 
euro area instead does not enjoy a yield privilege similar to other issuers of 
international currencies. On a positive note, though, a negative yield differential 
on the net foreign assets of euro area member states has been virtually eliminated 
in the run-up to EMU accession. The excess returns stemming from the capital 
gains of the United States are instead not matched by any other major issuer of 
international currencies and only by a handful of countries. 
The decomposition of excess returns shows that the exorbitant privilege of 
the United States is the result of an extraordinary return effect, i.e. the better 
performance of U.S. investment abroad compared to foreign investment in each of 
the main categories of the international investment position. Contrary to the 
finding of previous studies, the composition effect – i.e. the impact of a higher 
share of riskier investment in the foreign assets relative to liabilities – is negative. 
In different terms, the position of the United States as “levered investor” did not 
contribute to its exorbitant privilege, at least over the past two decades. The 
econometric analysis of excess returns also fails to find a robust positive 
relationship between leverage and excess returns in our panel of countries. There 
seem to be other more important determinants of excess returns. Notably, 
countries experiencing large real exchange rate depreciations may hope to boost 
their excess returns on net foreign assets, with an impact that is proportional to the 
relative foreign currency exposure. This effect is channelled through capital gains, 
not through investment income. Excess yields on investment income are instead 
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A. Appendix 
A.1 Data sources and definitions 
The sample includes annual data between 1980 and 2007 (unless otherwise indicated) for 49 countries 
divided in two groups. Advanced economies (20 countries): Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Emerging economies (29 countries): 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria (from 1991), Chile, China (from 1981), Colombia, Croatia (from 1997), 
Czech Republic (from 1993), Hong Kong, Hungary (from 1982), India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania (from1990), Russia (from1993), Singapore, 
Slovak Republic (from 1993), Slovenia (from 1992), South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
Table A.1 Data sources 
Variable Source
Balance of payments IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
International investment position (IIP) IMF Balance of Payments Statistics and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) Mark II database
US dollar bilateral exchange rate IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Real effective exchange rate IMF International Financial Statistics and Bloomberg
Finance weighted index Own calculations based on Lane and Shambaugh (2007) database
Currency composition of IIP Lane and Shambaugh (2007) database
Consumer price index IMF International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook database
Composite risk rating PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide*
* See below for details 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating of the PRS Group is an assessment of the country 
risk based on a set of 22 components grouped into three major categories (weight in parenthesis): 
political (50%), financial (25%), and economic (25%) risk. A separate index is created for each of the 
subcategories. Political risk is assessed on the basis of subjective ratings by analysts, whereas financial 
and economic risks are assessed on the basis of data. The index has been normalised between 0 
(highest risk) and 1 (lowest risk) and is available on annual frequency between 1984 and 2007. 
International Country Risk Guide Rating System 
Political risk components Economic risk components
Government Stability 12 GDP per head 5
Socioeconomic Conditions 12 Real GDP growth 10
Investment Profile 12 Annual inflation rate 10
Internal Conflict 12 Budget balance (% of GDP) 10
External Conflict 12 Current account (% of GDP) 15
Corruption 6 Total 50
Military in Politics 6 Financial risk components
Religious Tensions 6 Foreign debt (% of GDP) 10
Law and Order 6 Foreign debt service (% of XGS) 10
Ethnic Tensions 6 Current account (% of XGS) 15
Democratic Accountability 6 Reserves incl. gold (months of imports) 5
Bureaucracy Quality 4 Exchange rate stability (% change vs. USD) 10
Total 100 Total 50  
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Table A.2 Excess real returns, yields and rates of capital gain on net foreign assets. 1981-2007 (percentage) 




L 27 3.35 *** 0.86 0.12 3.89 6.85 -4.8 11.5 0.0 2.1
i
A - i
L 27 1.28 *** 0.08 0.98 1.33 1.67 0.4 2.1 -0.1 2.2
k
A - k
L 27 2.07 ** 0.82 -1.23 2.49 5.41 -5.5 9.8 0.1 2.0
United Kingdom r
A - r
L 27 0.16 0.45 -1.43 0.14 1.82 -5.1 4.9 -0.3 2.9
i
A - i
L 27 0.03 0.11 -0.48 0.06 0.54 -0.9 0.8 -0.1 1.7
k
A - k
L 27 0.14 0.43 -1.87 0.49 1.97 -4.3 4.4 -0.1 2.3
Austria r
A - r
L 27 -0.21 1.02 -3.09 -0.93 2.74 -15.7 13.8 0.0 5.5
i
A - i
L 27 -0.37 *** 0.10 -0.84 -0.45 0.02 -1.2 0.8 0.4 2.4
k
A - k
L 27 0.16 0.97 -2.53 -0.28 2.44 -14.4 13.9 0.1 5.6
Denmark r
A - r
L 27 0.62 0.77 -1.67 0.07 2.71 -6.3 9.8 0.5 3.2
i
A - i
L 27 -0.03 0.39 -1.49 -0.76 0.77 -2.2 6.0 1.4 4.4
k
A - k
L 27 0.65 0.70 -2.37 -0.53 3.47 -5.6 9.8 0.5 2.8
France r
A - r
L 27 -0.77 0.78 -3.77 -1.48 2.84 -9.4 6.9 0.0 2.4
i
A - i
L 27 -0.02 0.08 -0.29 -0.14 0.32 -0.9 0.6 0.0 2.2
k
A - k
L 27 -0.75 0.77 -3.73 -0.80 2.43 -10.1 6.4 -0.1 2.6
Germany r
A - r
L 27 -1.07 ** 0.53 -3.17 -0.54 0.65 -7.9 3.7 -0.3 2.7
i
A - i
L 27 -0.26 ** 0.10 -0.76 -0.38 0.07 -1.0 0.8 0.5 2.1
k
A - k
L 27 -0.82 0.54 -3.24 -0.55 1.11 -8.5 3.8 -0.5 3.4
Italy r
A - r
L 27 -1.94 ** 0.78 -4.09 -1.79 0.78 -11.0 5.9 -0.2 2.8
i
A - i
L 27 -2.23 *** 0.23 -3.17 -1.89 -1.15 -5.0 -0.7 -0.5 2.3
k
A - k
L 27 0.28 0.68 -2.15 0.19 2.56 -6.8 7.6 0.0 2.7
Netherlands r
A - r
L 27 -2.39 ** 1.15 -4.78 -3.09 -0.70 -18.3 17.6 0.8 7.2
i
A - i
L 27 -0.45 ** 0.20 -1.17 -0.47 0.24 -2.5 1.8 0.0 2.4
k
A - k
L 27 -1.94 * 1.08 -4.20 -3.02 -0.05 -18.3 15.8 0.4 7.2
Norway r
A - r
L 27 -0.86 1.04 -4.53 -1.43 1.88 -12.3 12.5 0.4 3.2
i
A - i
L 27 -1.40 *** 0.20 -1.98 -1.10 -0.67 -3.8 0.0 -0.8 2.7
k
A - k
L 27 0.55 1.03 -3.99 1.56 3.22 -9.7 13.6 0.4 2.9
Sweden r
A - r
L 27 -1.49 * 0.84 -5.06 -0.92 2.00 -13.4 4.6 -0.6 3.2
i
A - i
L 27 -0.14 0.27 -0.68 0.13 0.83 -4.0 1.6 -1.3 4.2
k
A - k
L 27 -1.35 * 0.74 -4.05 -1.07 2.32 -10.3 4.5 -0.3 2.4
Switzerland r
A - r
L 27 -1.32 1.23 -4.35 -1.43 2.04 -16.1 14.3 -0.1 4.2
i
A - i
L 27 1.17 *** 0.09 0.98 1.21 1.37 -0.2 2.0 -0.6 4.2
k
A - k
L 27 -2.49 ** 1.22 -5.63 -2.65 0.91 -17.2 12.4 -0.2 4.0
Canada r
A - r
L 27 -1.86 *** 0.59 -4.23 -2.32 0.11 -6.9 5.3 0.6 2.9
i
A - i
L 27 -1.48 *** 0.16 -2.05 -1.45 -1.05 -3.1 0.9 0.6 4.1
k
A - k
L 27 -0.38 0.52 -2.22 -0.81 1.15 -6.2 5.6 0.4 3.2
Japan r
A - r
L 27 -1.86 1.64 -5.30 -0.54 1.98 -22.0 15.7 -0.4 3.9
i
A - i
L 27 0.80 *** 0.16 0.23 0.67 1.57 -1.4 2.1 -0.4 3.0
k
A - k
L 27 -2.66 * 1.60 -6.43 -1.65 1.59 -22.7 14.0 -0.6 4.0
Finland r
A - r
L 27 -6.91 ** 3.44 -8.95 -4.77 0.82 -75.4 18.2 -2.4 9.9
i
A - i
L 27 -1.26 *** 0.45 -2.64 -1.17 0.47 -5.1 3.8 0.2 2.4
k
A - k
L 27 -5.65 3.46 -7.18 -2.62 1.96 -77.6 15.5 -2.8 11.5
Greece r
A - r
L 27 1.20 2.20 -5.84 -1.80 6.95 -14.9 36.0 1.4 4.8
i
A - i
L 27 -2.15 *** 0.26 -3.27 -2.08 -0.88 -4.2 0.4 0.2 1.8
k
A - k
L 27 3.35 2.26 -3.21 -0.04 9.00 -12.8 39.3 1.4 4.7
Ireland r
A - r
L 27 -3.85 *** 1.48 -8.17 -2.57 0.62 -25.0 12.8 -0.5 4.2
i
A - i
L 27 -3.98 *** 0.38 -5.88 -3.36 -2.21 -7.5 -1.2 -0.3 1.6
k
A - k
L 27 0.12 1.44 -3.56 -0.33 4.81 -21.8 18.1 -0.4 4.9
Portugal r
A - r
L 27 0.12 1.09 -2.59 -0.70 2.13 -15.2 12.4 0.2 4.3
i
A - i
L 27 -0.98 *** 0.37 -1.98 -0.58 0.01 -5.9 2.2 -0.9 3.8
k
A - k
L 27 1.11 1.14 -1.84 -0.01 2.08 -9.3 16.1 1.3 4.4
Spain r
A - r
L 27 -1.81 *** 0.63 -4.02 -2.12 0.34 -7.0 6.0 0.4 2.6
i
A - i
L 27 -1.06 *** 0.24 -2.04 -0.70 -0.22 -3.3 1.2 -0.4 2.1
k
A - k
L 27 -0.75 0.69 -3.41 -0.92 0.88 -6.0 8.7 0.8 3.1
Australia r
A - r
L 27 1.34 1.28 -2.45 2.05 5.12 -19.6 14.1 -0.8 5.2
i
A - i
L 27 -1.26 *** 0.21 -1.87 -1.28 -0.72 -3.8 1.7 0.4 4.3
k
A - k
L 27 2.60 ** 1.21 -0.08 3.44 5.58 -19.2 14.9 -1.3 6.9
New Zealand r
A - r
L 27 1.32 3.09 -9.84 0.66 7.58 -31.9 46.6 0.7 4.1
i
A - i
L 27 -2.90 *** 0.73 -5.67 -3.06 -1.19 -9.6 5.9 0.6 3.3
k
A - k




L 27 -3.15 ** 1.44 -6.91 -2.83 1.84 -16.4 12.6 -0.2 2.5
i
A - i
L 27 -1.20 *** 0.36 -1.84 -0.25 0.03 -5.6 0.5 -1.3 3.3
k
A - k
L 27 -1.95 1.48 -6.42 -0.90 2.99 -16.4 12.5 -0.2 2.3
South Africa r
A - r
L 27 -4.03 ** 1.76 -10.94 -5.80 1.67 -16.3 15.9 0.6 2.6
i
A - i
L 27 -3.36 *** 0.28 -4.18 -3.20 -2.62 -7.4 -0.9 -0.8 4.0
k
A - k
L 27 -0.67 1.66 -6.51 -2.14 3.66 -13.4 19.5 0.7 2.9
Israel r
A - r
L 27 -0.46 1.54 -5.17 0.02 4.56 -20.7 14.5 -0.2 3.1
i
A - i
L 27 -0.28 0.24 -1.09 -0.50 0.55 -2.5 2.4 0.3 2.5
k
A - k
L 27 -0.18 1.49 -4.76 -0.10 4.98 -20.2 13.5 -0.4 3.2  




L) and rates of capital gain (k
A-k
L) are calculated according to equations (5) to 
(7) in the main text. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A.2 (follows)
Variable N. obs. Mean St. Err. Lower Q Median Upper Q min Max Skewn. Kurt.
Argentina r
A - r
L 27 -2.06 5.66 -7.91 -0.01 4.09 -88.0 59.1 -1.0 6.2
i
A - i
L 27 -4.27 *** 0.44 -4.56 -3.73 -2.91 -9.8 0.0 -0.9 3.6
k
A - k
L 27 2.22 5.57 -3.81 1.80 9.00 -79.6 66.9 -0.6 5.9
Brazil r
A - r
L 27 2.01 3.83 -10.88 -2.67 9.94 -23.6 85.4 2.8 12.5
i
A - i
L 27 -3.08 *** 0.23 -3.83 -3.31 -1.91 -5.3 -0.8 0.0 2.4
k
A - k
L 27 5.09 3.89 -6.95 1.13 13.32 -21.9 90.5 2.8 12.9
Chile r
A - r
L 27 1.00 1.96 -7.32 -0.31 5.96 -19.1 26.7 0.7 3.4
i
A - i
L 27 -4.74 *** 0.58 -5.37 -4.18 -2.82 -14.0 -0.9 -1.5 5.0
k
A - k
L 27 5.74 *** 2.02 -0.45 4.35 8.81 -14.6 30.0 0.7 3.3
Colombia r
A - r
L 27 -5.31 *** 1.53 -9.62 -7.56 -0.67 -20.0 11.5 0.6 3.0
i
A - i
L 27 -5.52 *** 0.50 -7.69 -6.04 -3.40 -9.7 0.2 0.4 2.6
k
A - k
L 27 0.22 1.36 -3.12 -1.85 5.69 -17.3 13.5 0.2 3.2
Mexico r
A - r
L 27 -0.32 1.45 -4.48 -1.02 4.85 -14.3 19.1 0.5 3.3
i
A - i
L 27 -2.13 *** 0.36 -2.62 -1.77 -1.29 -10.2 -0.3 -3.1 13.8
k
A - k
L 27 1.82 1.34 -3.25 0.58 6.45 -11.5 19.3 0.5 3.1
Peru r
A - r
L 27 -1.26 2.16 -4.35 -0.51 3.67 -30.3 24.1 -0.3 3.9
i
A - i
L 27 -3.36 *** 0.63 -4.35 -2.55 -0.91 -12.2 0.4 -1.4 4.6
k
A - k
L 27 2.10 2.03 -0.64 1.79 4.61 -26.5 29.0 -0.1 4.8
Uruguay r
A - r
L 27 1.96 2.08 -2.54 -0.85 2.85 -8.7 49.3 3.2 14.9
i
A - i
L 27 -1.37 *** 0.33 -3.04 -1.21 0.20 -4.5 2.1 0.0 2.2
k
A - k
L 27 3.33 2.03 -1.13 0.63 3.85 -7.5 50.3 3.5 16.0
Venezuela r
A - r
L 27 -3.58 ** 1.52 -5.64 -2.78 -0.43 -35.1 9.6 -2.2 10.9
i
A - i
L 27 -2.46 *** 0.44 -3.50 -2.65 -1.57 -5.8 6.7 2.3 10.9
k
A - k
L 27 -1.13 1.40 -1.75 0.14 1.78 -32.8 9.3 -3.0 14.5
Hong Kong r
A - r
L 27 -1.43 1.70 -5.02 -2.38 3.86 -20.5 15.4 -0.2 3.1
i
A - i
L 27 -0.53 *** 0.15 -1.21 0.00 0.00 -2.1 0.0 -1.0 2.3
k
A - k
L 27 -0.90 1.67 -4.37 -1.51 3.89 -20.5 15.4 -0.2 3.1
India r
A - r
L 27 2.76 1.98 -1.46 3.34 5.63 -32.0 31.7 -0.7 8.1
i
A - i
L 27 0.91 * 0.50 -0.72 0.23 1.63 -2.1 9.1 1.7 5.9
k
A - k
L 27 1.85 2.05 -2.03 2.65 5.60 -30.3 32.3 -0.3 6.4
Indonesia r
A - r
L 27 -3.67 2.37 -12.03 -5.01 7.25 -28.7 14.3 -0.5 2.2
i
A - i
L 27 -3.07 *** 0.39 -4.59 -3.63 -1.18 -7.3 0.4 0.0 2.1
k
A - k
L 27 -0.59 2.37 -8.86 -1.23 8.43 -25.1 20.6 -0.4 2.3
Korea r
A - r
L 27 0.20 2.05 -6.01 0.23 6.17 -23.8 23.6 0.0 3.2
i
A - i
L 27 2.57 ** 1.10 -0.63 0.67 2.19 -2.4 20.0 1.9 5.3
k
A - k
L 27 -2.37 1.64 -9.12 -0.80 3.92 -23.9 13.8 -0.5 3.1
Malaysia r
A - r
L 27 -6.06 *** 2.25 -15.93 -5.17 -1.53 -26.6 19.2 0.3 2.4
i
A - i
L 27 -3.51 *** 0.27 -4.65 -3.37 -2.32 -6.3 -1.4 -0.5 2.2
k
A - k
L 27 -2.55 2.16 -12.90 -2.46 3.86 -21.9 21.5 0.3 2.3
Philippines r
A - r
L 27 0.44 1.74 -5.05 0.10 5.21 -18.6 19.8 0.4 3.1
i
A - i
L 27 -0.96 ** 0.42 -2.45 -1.77 -0.29 -3.6 4.4 1.1 3.3
k
A - k
L 27 1.40 1.67 -3.16 1.02 3.25 -18.1 21.6 0.4 3.5
Singapore r
A - r
L 27 -0.79 1.01 -5.04 -1.10 2.51 -9.5 13.2 0.0 3.2
i
A - i
L 27 -1.16 *** 0.35 -2.24 -1.16 -0.27 -5.5 3.0 -0.5 2.6
k
A - k
L 27 0.37 0.76 -2.75 -0.08 2.41 -7.1 10.2 0.4 3.0
Thailand r
A - r
L 27 -3.85 ** 1.57 -9.78 -3.35 1.38 -21.9 13.3 0.0 2.9
i
A - i
L 27 -1.61 *** 0.33 -2.50 -1.23 -0.60 -5.2 1.2 -0.7 2.8
k
A - k
L 27 -2.24 1.47 -6.04 -0.61 2.52 -20.7 12.4 -0.4 2.9
Bulgaria r
A - r
L 16 -0.16 2.14 -4.28 -0.85 3.30 -15.3 21.1 0.5 3.9
i
A - i
L 16 -2.25 *** 0.50 -3.74 -1.47 -0.69 -6.0 0.3 -0.7 2.3
k
A - k
L 16 2.08 1.99 -1.05 1.55 5.71 -12.5 21.6 0.5 3.8
Russia r
A - r
L 14 -12.15 *** 3.77 -20.75 -13.79 1.85 -42.2 7.8 -0.4 2.5
i
A - i
L 14 -3.32 *** 0.56 -3.78 -3.06 -2.41 -9.0 -0.1 -1.2 5.1
k
A - k
L 14 -8.83 *** 3.40 -17.40 -10.87 1.99 -33.2 12.7 0.0 2.2
China r
A - r
L 26 -5.62 ** 2.73 -11.88 -2.91 0.66 -40.2 34.8 0.1 5.2
i
A - i
L 26 -0.73 * 0.43 -2.58 -0.61 0.50 -3.9 3.5 0.3 2.2
k
A - k
L 26 -4.89 * 2.63 -13.16 -2.39 1.59 -39.6 31.3 -0.2 4.7
Czech Republic r
A - r
L 14 -2.90 * 1.52 -7.53 -0.70 0.02 -13.7 5.0 -0.7 2.3
i
A - i
L 14 -3.11 *** 0.39 -4.44 -2.84 -1.63 -5.6 -1.3 -0.2 1.6
k
A - k
L 14 0.20 1.19 -2.57 1.15 2.92 -8.1 6.3 -0.7 2.5
Slovak Republic r
A - r
L 14 -5.69 *** 2.13 -11.61 -4.77 0.20 -19.7 6.7 -0.3 2.2
i
A - i
L 14 -2.71 *** 0.52 -4.40 -1.70 -1.43 -6.8 -1.0 -1.1 2.6
k
A - k
L 14 -2.98 2.01 -6.39 -2.92 4.16 -18.4 8.3 -0.4 2.6
Hungary r
A - r
L 25 -1.38 2.16 -8.14 -2.50 0.97 -15.3 39.0 2.1 8.9
i
A - i
L 25 -1.07 *** 0.32 -2.43 -1.05 -0.04 -3.5 2.6 0.6 2.6
k
A - k
L 25 -0.32 1.94 -6.16 -1.09 1.49 -14.2 36.4 2.2 9.3
Croatia r
A - r
L 10 -3.36 4.51 -13.26 -9.32 5.36 -20.4 21.8 0.6 2.1
i
A - i
L 10 -2.86 *** 0.47 -3.74 -2.63 -2.18 -5.9 -0.8 -0.5 2.9
k
A - k
L 10 -0.51 4.57 -11.08 -6.52 8.17 -17.9 25.4 0.7 2.2
Slovenia r
A - r
L 15 -2.31 2.14 -6.98 -1.70 -0.01 -16.9 21.0 1.1 5.7
i
A - i
L 15 -1.32 *** 0.17 -1.94 -1.23 -0.77 -2.3 -0.2 -0.1 1.9
k
A - k
L 15 -0.99 2.09 -5.72 -0.47 1.93 -15.9 21.5 1.0 5.5
Poland r
A - r
L 27 -1.50 1.74 -6.42 -1.36 4.65 -19.1 20.8 0.1 3.1
i
A - i
L 27 -2.04 *** 0.43 -3.89 -2.84 0.08 -5.4 1.6 0.3 1.7
k
A - k
L 27 0.54 1.57 -4.66 0.04 6.28 -14.5 23.7 0.6 3.8
Romania r
A - r
L 17 -4.33 ** 1.80 -7.84 -3.42 0.29 -22.2 9.2 -0.5 3.5
i
A - i
L 17 -2.92 *** 0.55 -3.45 -2.13 -1.43 -8.1 -0.4 -1.0 2.8
k
A - k
L 17 -1.41 1.58 -3.10 -0.27 1.54 -18.8 10.7 -0.8 4.5  
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Table A.3 Decomposition of excess returns on net foreign assets: return versus composition 
effect. Annual averages (percentage) 




















Excess return 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.6 -0.2 1.2 0.7 0.5
Return effect -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4
 - FDI 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1
 - Equity -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2
 - Debt 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
 - Other -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1
Composition effect 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1
 - FDI 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.5 -0.4
 - Equity 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3
 - Debt 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
 - Other -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2




















Excess return -0.5 1.2 -1.6 -1.2 1.0 -2.2 -1.5 0.9 -2.4
Return effect 0.0 0.6 -0.6 -0.8 0.3 -1.1 -2.2 0.1 -2.3
 - FDI 0.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.5
 - Equity -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -1.4 0.1 -1.5
 - Debt -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6
 - Other 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.4
Composition effect -0.6 0.4 -1.0 -0.3 0.8 -1.1 0.7 0.8 -0.1
 - FDI 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.1
 - Equity -1.2 0.0 -1.0 -1.8 -0.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4
 - Debt 0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.0
 - Other -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1




















Excess return -1.7 -1.6 -0.2 -2.1 -1.5 -0.5 -3.3 -1.6 -1.7
Return effect -0.8 -1.3 0.5 -1.4 -1.4 0.0 -1.9 -1.4 -0.4
 - FDI -0.2 -0.7 0.5 -0.5 -1.0 0.5 -0.7 -1.1 0.4
 - Equity 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
 - Debt -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.1
 - Other -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7
Composition effect -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.1 -1.3
 - FDI 0.3 0.5 -0.5 0.2 0.6 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 -0.9
 - Equity -0.3 0.2 -0.7 -0.5 0.3 -1.0 -0.9 0.3 -1.5
 - Debt -1.4 -1.5 1.0 -0.6 -1.3 1.4 -0.4 -1.0 1.4
 - Other 0.5 0.5 -0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2




















Excess return 1.0 -1.6 2.7 2.1 -1.2 3.3 0.4 -1.2 1.6
Return effect 3.6 1.1 2.5 1.9 -0.7 2.6 -0.5 -0.8 0.3
 - FDI 0.9 -0.8 1.7 1.3 -0.9 2.2 0.5 -1.0 1.5
 - Equity -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -0.3 -1.5
 - Debt 3.4 2.7 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0
 - Other 0.0 -0.5 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.2 0.3
Composition effect -2.6 -2.7 0.1 0.1 -0.6 0.7 0.9 -0.4 1.3
 - FDI 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.0
 - Equity 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2
 - Debt -3.9 -3.1 0.1 -1.4 -1.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.8 1.4
 - Other 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3  




L) and rates of capital gain (k
A-k
L) are decomposed according to eq. (10):  
( )
()() ()
       
22
AL jj













where αj and λj are the weights of each asset class, j, in total assets and liabilities. The first term on the right-hand-side of 
(10) is the return effect, i.e. the weighted impact of excess returns within each asset class, and the second term is the 
composition effect, i.e. the excess return deriving from being long or short in each asset class in relative terms.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DRER -0.2464 -0.0750 * -0.0785 * -0.1588 0.0115 0.0103 -0.0876 -0.0866 * -0.0848 *
(0.2124) (0.0429) (0.0418) (0.1126) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.2009) (0.0465) (0.0439)
LEV (-1) 0.0661 ** -0.0020 0.0413 ** 0.0199 -0.0032 0.0041 0.0463 0.0012 0.0264
(0.0292) (0.0329) (0.0192) (0.0155) (0.0118) (0.0096) (0.0276) (0.0328) (0.0165)
RiskR 0.0050 -0.0877 -0.0213 0.0716 *** 0.0020 0.0176 -0.0666 -0.0898 -0.0673 **
(0.0425) (0.0651) (0.0287) (0.0225) (0.0251) (0.0203) (0.0402) (0.0598) (0.0279)
Const. -0.0156 0.0490 0.0028 -0.0670 *** -0.0169 -0.0284 * 0.0514 0.0659 0.0510 **
(0.0327) (0.0468) (0.0226) (0.0173) (0.0184) (0.0160) (0.0310) (0.0430) (0.0220)
R
2 Within 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.016 0.015
R
2 Between 0.149 0.006 0.127 0.283 0.025 0.229 0.100 0.041 0.088
R
2 Total 0.013 0.004 0.015 0.012 0.001 0.076 0.020 0.017 0.020
C o u n t r i e s 4 84 84 8 4 84 84 8 4 84 84 8
N. obs. 1212 1212 1212 1212 1212 1212 1212 1212 1212  
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equations (14) and (15) in the main text, according to three different 
methods: OLS between regression on country means (BE); OLS fixed-effects regression (FE) and GLS random-effects 
(RE). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for fixed-effects and random-effects estimations allow 
for clustering of residuals by country. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DNER 0.0001 0.1356 *** -0.0125 ** -0.0443 *** -0.0031 0.1352 ***
(0.0250) (0.0360) (0.0052) (0.0113) (0.0247) (0.0345)
DNER*FC -0.5614 0.1089 *** -0.6204 ***
(0.1292) (0.0370) (0.1211)
DNFWI -0.1563 ** 0.2109 *** -0.2133 ***
(0.0720) (0.0149) (0.0665)
LEV(-1) -0.0502 ** -0.0510 ** -0.0423 ** -0.0492 *** -0.0431 *** -0.0162 * -0.0126 -0.0202 -0.0115
(0.0202) (0.0197) (0.0202) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0087) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0185)
RiskR -0.3224 *** -0.2827 *** -0.2809 *** -0.0014 -0.0102 0.0271 -0.3579 *** -0.3131 *** -0.2819 ***
(0.0490) (0.0476) (0.0484) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0220) (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0433)
Const. 0.1974 *** 0.1733 *** 0.1961 *** -0.0081 *** -0.0050 *** -0.0166 *** 0.2553 *** 0.2235 *** 0.2287 ***
(0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0155) (0.0147) (0.0163)
Error corr. (φ) -0.9046 *** -0.9049 *** -0.9891 *** -0.3544 *** -0.3166 *** -0.3568 *** -0.9636 *** -0.9577 *** -1.0318 ***
(0.0448) (0.0468) (0.0382) (0.0432) (0.0458) (0.0423) (0.0457) (0.0487) (0.0407)
LogL 1373.9 1425.7 1260.1 3544.8 3582.4 3656.1 1417.2 1472.6 1316.0
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
N. obs. 1038 1035 1167 1038 1035 1167 1038 1035 1167
 
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equation (14) and (15) in the main text with the Pooled Mean Group 
maximum-likelihood estimator of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) with the following reparametrisation of our equations: 
101 1  () tt t t t yy x x φ θθ β ε − ∆= − − −∆+ 
where the subscript for individual countries and additional regressors have been eliminated to simplify the notation. The 
PMG estimator imposes common long-run slope coefficients (θ) but different short-term interactions (β) across countries. 
φ is an error correction term equal to (λ-1), where λ is the first-order autoregressive coefficient. Standard-errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DRER 1.7996 -0.0558 -0.0662 -0.0757 0.0099 0.0095 1.8752 -0.0656 -0.0775
(1.5265) (0.1700) (0.1794) (0.8859) (0.0273) (0.0270) (1.2760) (0.1510) (0.1652)
DRER*FC -1.3698 -0.3934 -0.3782 -2.2619 -0.0378 -0.0388 0.8921 -0.3556 -0.3161
(3.2786) (0.4330) (0.4355) (1.9028) (0.0662) (0.0661) (2.7405) (0.3898) (0.3966)
LEV (-1) 0.0952 -0.0854 ** -0.0230 0.0099 -0.0323 * -0.0289 * 0.0853 * -0.0531 * -0.0030
(0.0575) (0.0341) (0.0238) (0.0334) (0.0171) (0.0157) (0.0480) (0.0275) (0.0185)
RiskR -0.1357 -0.2118 ** -0.1526 *** 0.0562 0.1215 *** 0.1234 *** -0.1919 * -0.3333 *** -0.2718 ***
(0.1110) (0.0780) (0.0497) (0.0644) (0.0259) (0.0225) (0.0928) (0.0739) (0.0452)
Const. 0.0976 0.1690 ** 0.1187 *** -0.0533 -0.1088 *** -0.1104 *** 0.1509 * 0.2778 *** 0.2257 ***
(0.0929) (0.0651) (0.0430) (0.0539) (0.0216) (0.0194) (0.0776) (0.0617) (0.0382)
R
2 Within 0.017 0.034 0.030 0.000 0.133 0.132 0.020 0.045 0.042
R
2 Between 0.243 0.006 0.037 0.322 0.092 0.103 0.505 0.193 0.256
R










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DFWI 1.0103 -0.3240 * -0.3358 ** -3.0655 * -0.0066 -0.0077 4.0758 -0.3174 * -0.3211 **
(2.8790) (0.1681) (0.1702) (1.5627) (0.0208) (0.0208) (2.4805) (0.1569) (0.1571)
LEV (-1) 0.0573 -0.0862 ** -0.0227 0.0146 -0.0322 * -0.0285 * 0.0427 -0.0540 * -0.0035
(0.0494) (0.0351) (0.0245) (0.0268) (0.0170) (0.0156) (0.0425) (0.0283) (0.0187)
RiskR -0.1283 -0.2300 ** -0.1609 *** 0.0373 0.1216 *** 0.1235 *** -0.1656 -0.3516 *** -0.2795 ***
(0.1190) (0.0801) (0.0499) (0.0646) (0.0254) (0.0219) (0.1025) (0.0739) (0.0451)
Const. 0.0961 0.1838 ** 0.1251 *** -0.0385 -0.1088 *** -0.1105 *** 0.1346 0.2926 *** 0.2318 ***
(0.0995) (0.0668) (0.0433) (0.0540) (0.0211) (0.0190) (0.0857) (0.0617) (0.0383)
R
2 Within 0.014 0.030 0.026 0.000 0.132 0.132 0.015 0.041 0.038
R
2 Between 0.165 0.009 0.044 0.345 0.091 0.103 0.419 0.204 0.268
R
2 Total 0.006 0.017 0.025 0.001 0.108 0.114 0.009 0.049 0.055
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
N. obs. 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540
 
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equations (14) and (15) in the main text, according to three different 
methods: OLS between regression on country means (BE); OLS fixed-effects regression (FE) and GLS random-effects (RE). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for fixed-effects and random-effects estimations allow for clustering 
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Table A.7 Emerging market economies. Excess real returns, yields and rates of capital gain. 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DRER -0.2520 -0.0015 -0.0043 -0.1735 0.0196 0.0190 -0.0785 -0.0211 -0.0203
(0.3803) (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.2012) (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.3582) (0.0161) (0.0155)
DRER*FC -0.3914 -0.4651 -0.4627 * 0.1331 -0.0384 -0.0401 -0.5246 -0.4267 -0.4167
(1.1683) (0.2737) (0.2571) (0.6181) (0.0466) (0.0463) (1.1004) (0.2814) (0.2617)
LEV (-1) 0.0597 0.0252 0.0391 0.0357 0.0065 0.0082 0.0241 0.0187 0.0239
(0.0585) (0.0418) (0.0290) (0.0309) (0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0551) (0.0417) (0.0242)
RiskR 0.0117 -0.0535 -0.0347 0.0872 * -0.0110 -0.0050 -0.0755 -0.0425 -0.0572
(0.0899) (0.0763) (0.0466) (0.0476) (0.0292) (0.0254) (0.0847) (0.0665) (0.0399)
Const. -0.0224 0.0188 0.0078 -0.0747 ** -0.0121 -0.0163 0.0523 0.0309 0.0411
(0.0576) (0.0468) (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0542) (0.0408) (0.0263)
R
2 Within 0.013 0.021 0.020 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.022 0.022
R
2 Between 0.147 0.100 0.114 0.155 0.015 0.001 0.129 0.127 0.127
R










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Est. Method BE FE RE BE FE RE BE FE RE
DFWI -0.7742 -0.3253 ** -0.3343 *** -0.1463 0.0406 0.0384 -0.6279 -0.3658 *** -0.3628 ***
(0.5704) (0.1306) (0.1220) (0.3176) (0.0420) (0.0416) (0.5320) (0.1108) (0.1038)
LEV (-1) 0.0632 0.0338 0.0470 0.0350 0.0074 0.0091 0.0282 0.0264 0.0301
(0.0535) (0.0450) (0.0321) (0.0298) (0.0132) (0.0120) (0.0499) (0.0451) (0.0270)
RiskR 0.0167 -0.0480 -0.0253 0.0816 * -0.0096 -0.0036 -0.0649 -0.0384 -0.0520
(0.0835) (0.0726) (0.0421) (0.0465) (0.0284) (0.0246) (0.0779) (0.0643) (0.0365)
Const. -0.0233 0.0167 0.0032 -0.0700 ** -0.0129 -0.0171 0.0466 0.0296 0.0390
(0.0530) (0.0442) (0.0273) (0.0295) (0.0184) (0.0179) (0.0495) (0.0393) (0.0247)
R
2 Within 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.022 0.022 0.022
R
2 Between 0.137 0.096 0.113 0.123 0.009 0.000 0.137 0.135 0.132
R
2 Total 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.026 0.027 0.027
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
N. obs. 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675
Notes. The table shows the results of the estimation of equations (14) and (15) in the main text, according to three different 
methods: OLS between regression on country means (BE); OLS fixed-effects regression (FE) and GLS random-effects (RE). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for fixed-effects and random-effects estimations allow for clustering 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DRER -0.0785 * -0.0175 -0.0344 *** -0.1508 *** -0.0911 ** 0.0177
(0.0459) (0.1189) (0.0125) (0.0351) (0.0425) (0.1038)
DRER*FC -0.1731 0.3997 *** -0.3209
(0.3152) (0.1010) (0.2807)
DFWI -0.1331 -0.0376 -0.1620 *
(0.0891) (0.0302) (0.0857)
LEV(-1) -0.0281 -0.0286 -0.0245 -0.0348 *** -0.0161 * -0.0307 *** -0.0074 -0.0070 -0.0034
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0230) (0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0233)
RiskR -0.2266 *** -0.2246 *** -0.2828 *** 0.0181 0.1212 *** 0.0209 -0.3080 *** -0.2917 *** -0.3516 ***
(0.0605) (0.0592) (0.0597) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0246) (0.0617) (0.0612) (0.0614)
Const. 0.1879 *** 0.1873 *** 0.2379 *** -0.0070 *** -0.0366 *** -0.0081 *** 0.2697 *** 0.2569 *** 0.3085 ***
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0156) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0016) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0180)
Error corr. (φ) -1.0362 *** -1.0451 *** -1.0406 *** -0.3555 *** -0.3352 *** -0.3593 *** -1.0516 *** -1.0597 *** -1.0528 ***
(0.0532) (0.0562) (0.0569) (0.0544) (0.0532) (0.0538) (0.0533) (0.0547) (0.0559)
LogL 847.9 861.0 856.6 1951.8 1969.6 1943.9 861.5 868.9
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
N. obs. 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520
Table A.9 Emerging market economies. Excess real returns, yields and rates of capital gain. 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DRER -0.0693 ** -0.0420 0.0693 *** 0.0908 *** -0.0727 *** -0.0592 **
(0.0321) (0.0343) (0.0137) (0.0207) (0.0239) (0.0251)
DRER*FC -0.2268 -0.0359 -0.1327
(0.1833) (0.0700) (0.1451)
DFWI -0.5272 *** 0.1986 *** -0.5026 ***
(0.1477) (0.0363) (0.1303)
LEV(-1) -0.0666 ** -0.0767 *** -0.0555 * 0.0076 0.0109 0.0038 -0.0311 -0.0430 * -0.0288
(0.0283) (0.0274) (0.0308) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0092) (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0254)
RiskR -0.2613 *** -0.2751 *** -0.2404 *** 0.0231 0.0167 0.0384 ** -0.1848 *** -0.1935 *** -0.1980 ***
(0.0510) (0.0494) (0.0522) (0.0170) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0414) (0.0401) (0.0443)
Const. 0.1213 *** 0.1277 *** 0.1204 *** -0.0166 *** -0.0153 *** -0.0160 *** 0.1076 *** 0.1105 *** 0.1262 ***
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0099) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0099)
Error corr. (φ) -0.8761 *** -0.8661 *** -0.9277 *** -0.3988 *** -0.4062 *** -0.3266 *** -0.9458 *** -0.9276 *** -0.9943 ***
(0.0502) (0.0542) (0.0448) (0.0788) (0.0894) (0.0478) (0.0593) (0.0626) (0.0513)
LogL 682.7 713.4 690.2 2026.6 2047.2 2051.0 726.6 757.3 729.6
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
N. obs. 644 641 647 644 641 647 644 641 647
Notes. Tables A.8 and A.9 show the results of the estimation of equation (14) and (15) in the main text with the Pooled Mean 
Group maximum-likelihood estimator of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) with the following reparametrisation of our equations: 
101 1  () tt t t t yy x x φ θθ β ε − ∆= − − −∆+ 
where the subscript for individual countries and additional regressors have been eliminated to simplify the notation. The PMG 
estimator imposes common long-run slope coefficients (θ) but different short-term interactions (β) across countries. φ is an error 
correction term equal to (λ-1), where λ is the first-order autoregressive coefficient. Standard-errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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